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CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET 
Carl Tobias* 
This article uses the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CIRA) 
as the backdrop for addressing efforts to increase uniformity, sim-
plicity, and transsubstantivity, and to decrease expense and delay in 
civil litigation. Professor Tobias discusses both the origin and the 
implementation of the CIRA. By requiring each federal district 
court to formulate a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, 
the purpose of the CIRA is to decrease expense and delay in civil 
litigation. Professor Tobias argues that the CIRA has been suc-
cessful because districts have applied techniques that have saved 
cost and time and have provided new data that may prove valuable 
upon evaluation. Yet he argues that the CIRA does have shortfalls. 
A primary shortfall addressed in this article is that the CIRA effec-
tively suspended the purpose of the Judicial Improvements Act of 
1988 (JIA) to increase uniformity and simplicity in civil litigation. 
After a thorough evaluation of the effectuation of the CIRA, Pro-
fessor Tobias ultimately suggests that policy makers capitalize on 
the best aspects of the CIRA and the JIA, and he offers proposals 
for the future to increase efficiency in civil litigation. 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) instituted the most 
ambitious effort to experiment with procedures for reducing expense 
and delay in civil litigation during the 200-year history of the federal 
courts. All ninety-four federal district courts undertook searching in-
trospection of their civil and criminal caseloads and then adopted and 
applied measures that they believed would best conserve resources. 
Statutory enactment and implementation proved controversial partly 
because it is unclear precisely how much cost and delay attend civil 
lawsuits and whether either is sufficiently troubling to warrant treat-
ment, especially with the mechanisms prescribed in the legislation and 
employed by the districts. 
The passage and effectuation of the CJRA have also been prob-
lematic because numerous courts have enforced local requirements 
that conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provisions in 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I 
was a Professor of Law at the University of Montana when I completed most of the work on this 
article. I wish to thank Lauren Robel and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer 
and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust and Ann and Tom Boone 
for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group 
for the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed here and the 
errors that remain are mine. 
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the United States Code, and strictures in the remaining districts. This 
development has made the arcane state of federal civil litigation even 
more byzantine. An overwhelming number of procedural mandates 
now govern civil disputes. There are commands in the federal rules 
and the United States Code, while a plethora of local measures, in-
cluding local rules, individual judge practices, and the aforementioned 
CJRA requirements, cover civil cases in every federal court. Too 
many of the strictures are inconsistent, and some are difficult to dis-
cover, comprehend, and satisfy. These phenomena have further frag-
mented the already fractured condition of civil procedure and may 
actually have increased expense and delay in civil suits-impacts that 
are diametrically opposed to the 1990 statute's express goals. Indeed, 
the federal rules' fundamental tenets, such as uniformity and simplic-
ity, are now more eroded than at any time since the Supreme Court 
first promulgated those rules in 1938. 
Despite these complications, experimentation under the CJRA 
has apparently afforded numerous benefits. A significant percentage 
of districts have developed innovative, or applied existing, techniques 
that apparently have saved cost or time, while the testing of many 
mechanisms has generated much raw data that deserve evaluation and 
synthesis and that should yield instructive insights on district courts 
and civil litigation at the conclusion of the twentieth century. 
Now that the unprecedented, seven-year experiment with proce-
dures for decreasing expense and delay is drawing to a close, the expe-
rience warrants analysis. This article undertakes that effort. The 
opening section traces the CJRA's origins and development, empha-
sizing the Supreme Court's adoption of the initial federal rules and the 
subsequent half-century history, the 1988 passage of the Judicial Im-
provements Act (JIA), and the 1990 enactment of the CJRA.1 
The second part assesses CJRA implementation. It first exam-
ines the detriments and advantages of experimentation's effectuation, 
oversight, and evaluation in the ninety-four courts and the efficacy of 
the measures that districts prescribed and employed. The section next 
affords lessons derived from statutory implementation, ascertaining 
that the CJRA was a modest reform that the vast majority of courts 
cautiously effectuated, as evidenced by the RAND Corporation's 
finding that the procedures applied had minimal impact on important 
parameters, namely, cost. Congress also intended the CJRA and the 
JIA to treat the above problems in modern civil disputing, although 
the enactments may have exacerbated the difficulties in certain re-
spects because senators and representatives apparently failed to think 
1. The JIA is Title IV of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071-2074 
(1994)). The CJRA is Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 
Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)). 
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through the process and reconcile the statutory purposes and 
implementation. 
The third part offers suggestions for the future that policy mak-
ers, such as Congress and judges, should effectuate. It posits numer-
ous principles that support the recommendations provided and that 
could inform their implementation. For example, I propose that the 
CJRA and the JIA be harmonized, principally by maximizing the stat-
utes' best features and minimizing their worst aspects. Senators and 
representatives should specifically allow the CJRA to sunset and facil-
itate the comprehensive effectuation of the JIA's major objectives of 
restoring the primacy of the national rule revision process and limiting 
local procedural proliferation, goals that the CJRA essentially sus-
pended. Congress must also defer to that national amendment pro-
cess and eschew legislative revision, while the districts should 
abrogate all inconsistent local requirements, particularly strictures 
that they adopted under the 1990 statute. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM AcT 
The origins and development of the CJRA warrant relatively de-
tailed examination in this article, even though several commentators 
have rather thoroughly chronicled the relevant background else-
where.2 Comparatively broad analysis is justified because that type of 
assessment can improve understanding of the CJRA and because the 
coalescence of a rich, complex mix of phenomena, most of which can 
be traced to the federal rules' 1938 adoption, eventually culminated in 
statutory enactment. 
A. The 1938 Federal Rules and Their First Half Century 
The developments that prompted Congress to pass the 1934 
Rules Enabling Act,3 authorizing the U.S. Supreme Court to prescribe 
rules of practice for civil litigation in the federal district courts, de-
serve considerable treatment here. This background, especially the 
promulgation of the initial federal rules during 1938, enhances com-
prehension of subsequent developments, implicating the first half-cen-
tury experience with those rules, which ultimately led to enactment of 
the JIA and of the CJRA. 
2. See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 833 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Jus-
tice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992); and Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994), for thorough discussion of the origins and 
development of the CIRA of 1990. 
3. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994)). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, 130 u. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
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1. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the 1938 Federal Rules 
Around the turn of the century, judges, attorneys, and law profes-
sors became increasingly dissatisfied with common-law and code prac-
tice and procedure, and this concern prompted growing calls for 
reform.4 Support for change escalated after Roscoe Pound's famous 
1906 speech to the American Bar Association.5 A disparate coalition 
of individuals as diverse as Dean Pound and Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft eventually developed a compromise that Congress 
passed as New Deal legislation during 1934.6 The statute empowered 
the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure covering resolu-
tion of civil litigation in the federal district courts.7 During 1935, the 
Court appointed the initial Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, 
which included four law professors and nine attorneys and whose re-
porter was Charles Clark.8 The Committee commenced work that 
year and tendered its draft to the Supreme Court during 1937.9 The 
Court modified little of the material that the Committee had submit-
ted and forwarded the procedures as altered to the attorney general, 
who transmitted them to Congress in January 1938. The proposals 
took effect by congressional inaction during September 1938.10 
Charles Clark and the Committee members meant to treat the 
problems of common-law and code practice and procedure.11 The 
drafters intended to modify the highly technical character of the prior 
procedural regimes, thereby eliminating the "sporting theory" of jus-
tice.12 The attorneys and law professors had numerous concepts in 
mind when writing the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 The 
Advisory Committee wished to craft procedures that were simple, uni-
form, and transsubstantive, that is, procedures generalized across sub-
stantive lines.14 The lawyers and academicians also wanted to afford 
4. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Law-
suit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 78 (1989); Burbank, 
supra note 3, at 1035-48; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 949 (1987). 
5. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 409-13 (1906). 
6. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 944-73; see also Burbank, supra note 3, at 1090-98. 
7. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1098-1184. 
8. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 
494, 502-15 (1986); Subrin, supra note 4, at 961-82. 
9. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 494; Subrin, supra note 4, at 961-83. 
10. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 973; see also Resnik, supra note 8, at 494 n.l. 
11. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 4, at 914-21, 926-73; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272-73 (1989). 
12. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 439-40 (1986); Subrin, supra note 4, at 948-73; see also 
Pound, supra note 5, at 405-06 ("sporting theory"). See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCE-
DURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965). 
13. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of 
the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975); Tobias, supra note 11, at 272-77. 
14. See Cover, supra note 13, at 718. See generally Carl Tobias, The Transformation of 
Trans-substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992). 
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attorneys much control over litigation, particularly in discovery; to 
limit judicial discretion; to foster prompt, inexpensive dispute resolu-
tion; and to emphasize merits-based dispositions.15 The Committee 
attempted to achieve simplicity by reducing the significance of plead-
ing and limiting the number of steps in litigation.16 It concomitantly 
wished to increase uniformity by requiring that each federal district 
court apply identical procedures.17 
These basic procedural precepts were not absolutes, and they 
might even conflict. For example, Federal Rule 83,18 by providing that 
each of the ninety-four federal district courts could adopt local proce-
dures, enabled them to prescribe requirements that would undermine 
uniformity and simplicity. The choice to institute an equity-driven 
scheme, by essentially merging law into equity,19 and to rely upon a 
liberal, flexible procedural regime correspondingly opened access to 
federal courts and fostered the pursuit of complicated lawsuits with 
multiple parties and issues that could increase cost and delay in resolv-
ing disputes.20 Affording lawyers considerable control while restrict-
ing that of judges concomitantly facilitated unfocused litigation and 
broad discovery that might impose expense and delay. 
2. The Federal Rules' First Third of a Century 
The Advisory Committee and the federal judiciary were able to 
maintain the fundamental procedural tenets examined above during 
the first three decades after the 1938 federal rules' adoption.21 The 
Committee proffered relatively few amendments, a number of which 
were technical in nature, while federal courts encountered little diffi-
culty interpreting and enforcing the initial rules and praised their effi-
cacy.22 For instance, the judiciary promoted simplicity by relying upon 
a general, liberal pleading system, which it pragmatically and flexibly 
applied, and by essentially leaving discovery to counsel.23 The judges 
15. For discussion of these and other important goals of the drafters, see Resnik, supra 
note 8, at 502-15; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 AB.A. J. 
1648 (1981); and Tobias, supra note 11, at 272-77. 
16. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 15, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 11, at 274; see also Mar-
cus, supra note 12, at 439-40. 
17. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650 (discussing uniform procedures); Tobias, supra 
note 11, at 274-75 (same). 
18. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83. 
19. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 1000-01; Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 
11, at 274-75. 
20. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 1001; Resnik, supra note 8, at 502 n.30. 
21. See Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 
435 (1958). See generally Resnik, supra note 8, at 516; Tobias, supra note 11, at 277-78. 
22. Charles Clark, the Reporter and a Second Circuit judge, fostered some of this. See, 
e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in 
the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49 (1957); see also Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to 
the Federal Rules?, 14 Omo ST. L.J. 241 (1953); Tobias, supra note 11, at 277-78. 
23. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 439-40, 445-46 (pleading); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 397 (1982) (discovery). But cf Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing 
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also preserved and fostered uniformity by prescribing comparatively 
few local procedures, especially strictures that were inconsistent with 
the federal rules or acts of Congress.24 
Each of the original federal rules was not equally effective, and 
judges, lawyers, and litigants undermined certain essential procedural 
precepts. For example, in the 1950s, the liberal pleading system 
prompted judges of the Ninth Circuit to request amendment of Rule 
8, while Charles Clark repelled an analogous effort mounted by judges 
in the Southern District of New York.25 The simple, but open-ended, 
discovery regime led to some difficulties, such as broad discovery re-
quests, which proved particularly problematic in complex cases.26 
3. The Federal Rules Since the Mid-1970s 
Numerous developments have led to growing disenchantment 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this concern was ini-
tially expressed in the 1970s. Many judges, a number of attorneys, and 
some writers contended that there was a litigation explosion in the 
federal courts.27 These observers claimed that lawyers and litigants 
were bringing substantial numbers of civil cases, too few of which 
were meritorious.28 Several members of the Supreme Court voiced 
discontent about abuse of the litigation process, especially in discov-
ery, and they remonstrated appellate and district court judges to sanc-
tion attorneys and parties who perpetrated abuse.29 
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (!), 81 
HARV. L. REv. 356 (1967) (suggesting Rules 19, 23, and 24 were read inflexibly); Benjamin 
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (II), 81 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1968). 
24. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2016-19 (1989). Many states 
premised their procedures on the federal analogues. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery 
Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2237, 2237 (1989); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A 
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377-78 (1986). 
25. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 445. 
26. See New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheus Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206 
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 
CoLuM. L. REV. 480 (1958) (contemporaneous account); Subrin, supra note 4, at 982-84 (subse-
quent account). 
27. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipa-
tion, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECrIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23, 24 (A. Leo 
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have 
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in id. at 209, 211-12; see also Tobias, supra note 11, at 287-89. 
28. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
29. See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998-100 
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 
639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975). 
No. 2] CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET 553 
a. Managerial Judging 
A number of federal district court judges, principally in large 
metropolitan districts, such as the Central District of California and 
the Southern District of New York, responded to the perceived litiga-
tion explosion and abuse with numerous measures that facilitated 
their active involvement in civil cases and that were dubbed "manage-
rial judging."30 The judges relied upon pretrial conferences to oversee 
litigation's pace, narrow and resolve disputed issues, and foster settle-
ment, typically by employing certain alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) techniques.31 
A number of judges monitored the breadth and pace of discov-
ery, and some courts imposed sanctions for abuses of the discovery or 
litigation processes.32 Certain judges developed creative techniques, 
such as minitrials and mandatory summary jury trials, particularly for 
treating complex litigation.33 The Manual for Complex Litigation34 
correspondingly afforded a plethora of mechanisms for resolving spe-
cific types of complex cases, such as securities, mass tort, and employ-
ment discrimination suits. The 1983 revisions in the federal rules and 
the 1985 issuance of the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second,35 ef-
fectively codified many practices with which judges had been experi-
menting under the rubric of managerial judging. 
The 1983 amendments of Rules 11, 16, and 26 undermined uni-
formity and simplicity. For example, all three revisions eroded sim-
plicity by expanding the number of steps in a lawsuit and by imposing 
increased, and more onerous, duties on attorneys, such as mandatory 
participation in pretrial and discovery conferences.36 Rule 16's new 
version reduced uniformity by suggesting that judges tailor procedures 
to specific cases and that each judge craft individual scheduling orders 
30. See generally STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouRTS (1977); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal 
Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 675-78 (1988). 
31. See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424 (1986) (ADR); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal 
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. 
L. REV. 770 (1981) (remaining propositions); Resnik, supra note 23, at 391-400 (same). 
32. See Peckham, supra note 31; Resnik, supra note 23, at 391-400. 
33. See E. ALLAN LIND & JoHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF CouRT-ANNEXED ARBI-
TRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT CouRTS (1983); Frank E. Sander, Varieties of Dispute 
Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976). 
34. MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LITIGATION (1982). See generally Alan J. Simons, The Manual 
for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 473 
(1988). . 
35. Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461U.S.1097 (1983); MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985). 
36. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amend-
ments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933 (1991). See generally ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING 
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1984). 
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for particular categories of cases.37 The Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion, Second, concomitantly reduced uniformity by instructing judges 
to treat many complicated suits differently than routine, simple cases 
and to adjust specific measures to particular classes of complex 
actions.38 
b. The Proliferation of Local Procedures 
Another critical source of mounting dissatisfaction with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure has been the profound increase in local 
procedures since the 1938 rules' adoption, a phenomenon that has ex-
panded exponentially in the last quarter century. Courts instituted 
much managerial judging, particularly before the 1983 federal rule re-
visions, by promulgating local procedures.39 These local strictures fre-
quently conflicted with the federal rules, acts of Congress, and local 
procedures in the remaining ninety-three federal districts. The classic 
illustration was the Northern District of California's promulgation of a 
"complex rule" that required attorneys to attend preliminary meetings 
apart from the pretrial conference and prepare joint pretrial state-
ments addressing many factors, such as the disputed factual issues and 
settlement negotiations.40 Since the mid-1970s, judges have pre-
scribed growing numbers of local strictures, either under the heading 
of managerial judging or independently. 
In the 1980s, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the 
policy-making arm of the federal courts, recognized the difficulties 
that attended local procedural proliferation and responded in several 
ways. The Conference orchestrated issuance of the 1985 amendment 
of Federal Rule 83 that specifically required that the standing orders 
of specific judges not conflict with the federal rules or local rules.41 
The advisory committee's note that attended the revision asked each 
district to implement procedures for adopting and monitoring stand-
ing orders.42 The note correspondingly requested that circuit judicial 
councils review all local rules and determine if the provisions were 
valid or conflicted and if they promoted interdistrict consistency and 
uniformity. 43 
37. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 36, at 942-46. See generally In re 
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988). 
38. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 11, at 292 n.148. Managerial 
judging was occurring in state court systems at the same time. For example, many trial judges in 
urban areas responded to civil backlogs with procedures, such as special pretrial conferences, 
discovery limitations, and ADR. See BARRY MAHONEY, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL CouRTS 
(1988). See generally Lieberman & Henry, supra note 31; Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model 
and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1553 (1994). 
39. See Peckham, supra note 31, at 773-77; Resnik, supra note 23, at 399. 
40. See N.D. CAL. R. 235-7, reprinted in Peckham, supra note 31, at 776 n.30; see also 
Peckham, supra note 31, at 776-77. 
41. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83 (1985 amend.). 
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amend.). 
43. See id. 
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The Judicial Conference also responded to local proliferation by 
establishing the Local Rules Project.44 The Conference asked the 
Project to assemble and organize each local rule, individual judge 
standing order, and every other local stricture that functioned simi-
larly.45 Moreover, the Conference requested that the Project analyze 
difficulties that proliferating local requirements created and suggest 
means of treating the difficulties that the Project discovered. 46 
In 1989, the Project issued its assessment of local civil proce-
dures.47 The Project found that the federal district courts had promul-
gated some 5000 local rules, many of which conflicted with the federal 
rules, provisions of the United States Code, and local requirements in 
other courts.48 The most widely adopted local strictures governed the 
pretrial process, especially pretrial conferences and discovery. Many 
districts employed a number of specific measures, such as presumptive 
numerical limitations on interrogatories or special case-tracking 
schemes for addressing comparatively routine, simple cases.49 The 
ninety-four districts also varied significantly. For instance, the Middle 
District of Georgia had issued only one local rule and eleven standing 
orders, even as the Central District of California had prescribed 
thirty-one local rules with 434 subrules, augmented by 275 standing 
orders.50 
Local rules are merely one type of local stricture that has under-
mined uniformity and simplicity. The Local Rules Project found that 
quite a few additional requirements, variously denominated general 
orders, standing orders, special orders, scheduling orders, or minute 
orders, as well as individual judge practices, covered local litigation in 
the ninety-four districts.51 Many courts and judges have also em-
ployed numerous procedures that they have not reduced to writing.52 
44. See COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACflCE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJEcr: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACfICE (1989) 
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PRorncr]; see also Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The 
Role of Local Rules, AB.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62 (providing summary of Local Rules Project). 
45. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, 
Project Director, Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992). 
46. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, 
supra note 45. 
47. See REPORT OF THE LocAL RULES PROJEcr, supra note 44. 
48. See Subrin, supra note 24, at 2020-26; see also Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 62-65. 
49. See, e.g., U.S. D1sT. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JusTICE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCflON PLAN 2 (1991), available in 1991WL525112 (C.J.R.A.) [hereinafter E. DIST. 
OF NEW YORK PLAN]; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF WYO., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCfION PLAN 2 (1991), available in 1991 WL 525106 (C.J.R.A.) [hereinafter WYO-
MING PLAN]; see also Subrin, supra note 24, at 2020-26. 
50. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 62. 
51. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45; Telephone Interview 
with Stephen N. Subrin, Consultant, Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992). 
52. For example, a few districts experimented with coequal assignments of civil cases to 
Article III judges and magistrate judges. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE D1sT. OF MoNT., 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCf!ON PLAN 3-4 (1991) [hereinafter MONTANA 
PLAN]. See generally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MoNT. L. REv. 91, 
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The Judicial Conference responded to the Local Rules Project's find-
ings with an order that asked the federal districts to make all local 
requirements consistent with the federal rules and that afforded other 
helpful suggestions, such as proposing uniform numbering of the fed-
eral and local rules.53 Not all districts have thoroughly implemented 
the recommendations, however.54 
These developments, especially the rise of managerial judging 
and the 1983 federal rules amendments, depart significantly from the 
tenets that animated the drafters of the 1938 rules, changing and even 
reversing the prior work.55 Certain modifications might represent ef-
forts to make the rules function as initially intended or to correct er-
rors by instituting ideas that the Advisory Committee eschewed in the 
1930s.56 Additional alterations may constitute attempts to fill gaps in 
the original rules or constitute new understandings.57 Perhaps most 
important, managerial judging and the 1983 revisions might be an ac-
knowledgment that the uniform, simple, procedural regime that the 
1938 rules implemented may be partly responsible for the perceived 
explosion of litigation and litigation abuse. 
c. Concerns About Procedural Rule Revision Processes 
During the last quarter century, many observers, including mem-
bers of Congress, have expressed concerns about the processes for re-
vising the requirements that cover federal practice, especially the civil 
rules. In 1973, Congress intervened in the national rule amendment 
process by enacting legislation that replaced the Federal Rules of Evi-
93 n.9 (1992). Some districts required that litigants make good faith efforts to resolve discovery 
disputes before filing motions and to so certify in writing. See, e.g., WYOMING PLAN, supra note 
49, at 13. 
53. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45; Telephone Interview 
with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 51. Neither the Project Director nor its Consultant believes 
that there has been substantial nationwide compliance. Id. 
54. This assertion is premised on the telephone conversations cited supra notes 45 and 51. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently adopted a Rule 83 amendment that requires consistent 
numbering. See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (1995 amend.). Numerous districts have complied with the 
Judicial Conference request that they consistently number local rules. Illustrative are the Dis-
trict of Minnesota and the Middle District of North Carolina. See RULES OF PRAcrrcE AND 
PROCEDURE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (1996); RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 
NORTH CAROLrNA (1998). 
55. I rely most here on Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650-52. For example, revised Rules 11, 
16, and 26 replaced attorney self-regulation with judicial control, while Rule 26 restricted open-
ended discovery. Local proliferation eroded interfederal district court uniformity, and sugges-
tions in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985) and Rule 16(b) that judges 
develop prototypical scheduling orders for different types of cases have limited intercase uni-
formity. Similarly, the rise of managerial judging and its codification in Rule 16 exemplified 
efforts to tailor procedures to particular cases, thus eroding the 1938 rules' transsubstantive 
basis. 
56. For example, Rule 16 could be an effort to have pretrial conferences restrict the scope 
of, or expose, frivolous cases. The issue formulation provision institutes a concept like one Clark 
suggested in 1935 but the Committee rejected. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 978-79. 
57. This is true of Rule 16's allusion to settlement. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 496, 527. 
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dence the Supreme Court had adopted the year before, thereby pre-
empting much effort of Judicial Conference committees that had 
developed the procedures.58 During the following year, Congress in-
tervened in another amendment process by delaying the effective date 
of the revised Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure until 1975.59 
This legislative activity led Professor Howard Lesnick to call for 
reconsideration of the federal rule amendment processes in 1975.60 
He suggested that there be serious inquiry and reexamination of those 
processes' openness; of the Conference Committees' composition and 
the centralization of authority for appointments in the Chief Justice of 
the United States; of the propriety of the Court's role as promulgator 
of rules; and of the meaningfulness of congressional review of rule 
revisions. 61 
During the mid-1970s, Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York gave several thought-provoking lectures on rule re-
vision.62 Judge Weinstein described the historical development of 
court rulemaking and offered numerous suggestions for improving the 
national and local rule revision processes.63 These included somewhat 
reduced roles for certain participants, especially Congress and the 
Supreme Court, changes in procedures for appointing various commit-
tee members, and more regularized processes for local procedural 
revision. 64 
During 1979, the Judicial Conference convened a convocation on 
federal rulemaking and in 1981 the Conference issued a comprehen-
sive report titled Federal Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities. 65 
Although this effort may have been undertaken partly in response to 
the developments described above, the specific impetus was Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger's request for reexamination of the entire rulemak-
ing process, particularly the Court's role in it.66 The report thoroughly 
58. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27-29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987-
89; see also Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. 
59. See Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-Examination, 
61 AB.A. J. 579, 579 (1975); see also Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397. 
Congress thereafter often intervened to "delay the effective date of, disapprove, or modify rules 
and amendments." See H.R. REP. No 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987. 
60. See Lesnick, supra note 59. 
61. See id. at 579-84. 
62. See JACK WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977); see also 
Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 905 
(1976) (condensed version). 
63. See Weinstein, supra note 62, at 911-43. 
64. See id. at 927-57. Professor Geoffrey Hazard responded to Judge Weinstein and Profes-
sor Lesnick by suggesting that a Jess than fully democratic rule revision process produced better 
proposals for procedural change than a more open process. See Geoffrey Hazard, Undemocratic 
Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1287-94 (1978) (book review). 
65. WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (Federal 
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1981). 
66. The Chief Justice's request appeared in his 1979 Annual Report on the State of the 
Judiciary. See BROWN, supra note 65, at vi. 
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canvassed the existing revision process; criticisms and proposals for 
change, including the structure of rule revision committees, the con-
tent of rules, and Congress's reviewing role; and specific proposals re-
lating to structure and process.67 
Since the mid-1980s, there had been mounting criticism of the 
1983 federal rule revisions, particularly of amended Rule 11. One im-
portant criticism was that the revisors premised Rule 11 's modification 
on limited empirical data regarding the problems, such as the litiga-
tion explosion and litigation abuse, that it was intended to solve and 
on the efficacy of the changes as a solution.68 Another criticism re-
flected in the 1983 alteration, which has been publicly aired only dur-
ing the 1990s,69 is that the rule revisors have been overly responsive to 
the federal judiciary's needs and insufficiently solicitous of other users 
of the federal courts, namely, lawyers and litigants.70 Some critics 
ascribe this phenomenon primarily to the rule amendment entities' 
composition because the committees have consisted primarily of fed-
eral judges.71 
Congressional interest in the rule revision processes and federal 
civil procedure continued after the early 1970s. In 1977, Congress be-
gan holding hearings that eventually led to passage of the JIA.72 Dur-
ing the early 1980s, Congress intervened significantly in the civil rule 
revision process by rewriting a proposed amendment to Rule 4, gov-
erning service of process, that the Supreme Court had transmitted.73 
Many of the above developments culminated in congressional passage 
of the JIA in 1988, although it is important to understand that the 
legislation had a decade-long gestation period. 
B. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 
Congress intended to respond to some criticisms of federal civil 
procedure examined above when it passed the JIA. The requirements 
67. See generally BROWN, supra note 65. 
68. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Exam-
ple of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925 (1989); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for 
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993). 
69. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 897 (1992); 
Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 
17, 1992, at 15; John Frank, Rule 11-The Need to Start Over (May 1, 1992) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). 
70. See Tobias, supra note 69, at 897; Frank, supra note 69. 
71. See Kaster & Wittenberg, supra note 69; Frank, supra note 69; see also Lesnick, supra 
note 59, at 581-82. Other criticisms of Rule 11 were that it fostered satellite litigation and dis-
couraged valid suits. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 69, at 860-63; Walker, supra note 68, at 456-59. 
72. See H.R. REr. No. 100-889, at 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5983. 
73. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 
Stat. 2527 (1983); see also Paul Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733 (1988) (describing prospects for reform of Rule 4). See generally 
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 844-46 (1991). Criticism of the rule revision processes has 
continued. See generally Burbank, supra note 68; Mullenix, supra; Walker, supra note 68. 
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that the statute imposed and the legislative intent in enacting the mea-
sure are considered first. The second section of this article descrip-
tively analyzes the JIA's implementation, as witnessed in the rule 
revision process that yielded the 1993 federal rule amendments and in 
efforts relating to local procedural change. 
The advocates of the JIA meant to modernize, systematize, and 
open the national and local processes for revising applicable proce-
dures. The JIA's sponsors seemingly wished to restore the primacy of 
the national rule amendment process and to restrict local procedural 
proliferation. The proponents may also have intended to revitalize 
several procedural precepts, namely, uniformity and simplicity, which 
motivated the original Advisory Committee. 74 
1. National Rule Revision 
Congress intended that the JIA open the national rule revision 
process to enhanced public scrutiny and participation, thereby ostensi-
bly improving the quality of procedural changes.75 The legislation es-
sentially assimilated federal rule amendment to notice-comment 
rulemaking for federal administrative agencies under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.76 The JIA provided for increased public involve-
ment from the earliest phases of revisions' formulation. 
The JIA prescribed enhanced public access to information that is 
relevant to amendments, while requiring that meetings of certain rule 
revision entities, particularly the Advisory Committee, be opened to 
the public after notice is afforded.77 The JIA also required that any 
entity that makes a suggestion for procedural change "shall provide a 
proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report 
explaining the body's action, including any minority or other separate 
views."78 Moreover, the legislation afforded Congress several addi-
tional months to review revisions that the Supreme Court forwards, in 
an apparent attempt to enhance that review's effectiveness.79 
74. Some JIA provisions, including its encouragement of experimentation with court-
annexed arbitration, are not central to this article. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994); see also infra 
text accompanying note 296 (stating that the 105th Congress authorized all districts to employ 
court-annexed arbitration). See generally BARBARA s. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBI-
TRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1990) (recommending Congress 
enact an arbitration provision authorizing arbitration in all federal district courts to be 
mandatory or voluntary or a combination of both). The JIA also prescribed creation of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee and asked it to study comprehensively the federal courts and 
issue a report. See Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988). 
See generally REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990). 
75. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987; see also 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994). See generally Mullenix, supra note 73, at 830-32. 
76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994). 
77. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073. 
78. 28 u.s.c. § 2073(d). 
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 26, reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987. 
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Congress left essentially intact some aspects of the national rule 
amendment process. All of the institutions-the Congress, the Court, 
the Judicial Conference, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules 
of Practice, Procedure and Evidence (Standing Committee), and the 
Advisory Committee-that had traditionally been involved in rule re-
vision continue to participate. Congress correspondingly decided to 
retain the entities' existing composition, although it did consider pos-
sible change in the Advisory Committee's constitution.80 
2. Local Rule Revision 
Congress meant for the 1988 legislation to rectify or ameliorate 
problems that expanding local procedures had engendered. Indeed, 
the House Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the statute 
stated that the Committee had "found a proliferation of local rules, 
many of which conflict with national rules of general applicability."81 
The report also observed that the Judicial Conference was addressing 
the "problem of proliferating local rules," while representatives 
praised the Local Rules Project for its "valuable work" and remarked 
on the Project's continuing efforts.82 
Congress attempted to limit local procedural proliferation princi-
pally by imposing restrictions on local procedural amendment that re-
sembled those for federal rule revision. Senators and representatives 
essentially intended these strictures to regularize local procedural 
amendment and improve local procedures by opening local processes 
to increased public involvement and scrutiny. The legislation com-
manded each federal district to appoint a local rules committee that 
would assist all of the court's judges in developing local rules while 
imposing public notice and comment requirements on courts that pre-
scribe new, or amend existing, local rules.83 Congress seemingly 
meant for these mandates also to cover the procedures that individual 
judges employ.84 Congress correspondingly made exclusive the revi-
sion processes prescribed, thus attempting to guarantee that courts 
and judges would not avoid them by attributing to local requirements 
a different name, such as a standing or minute order.85 
An important way that senators and representatives sought to re-
duce local procedural proliferation was to impose specifically on cir-
cuit judicial councils an affirmative responsibility to review 
80. The proposal would have required that advisory committees "consist of a balanced 
cross section of the bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges." Paul D. Carrington, Making 
Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-
Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2076 n.50 (1989). 
81. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5988. 
82. Id. at 28-29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5989. 
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). As with the national rule revision entities, Congress did 
not prescribe committee composition. See also supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 note. 
85. See id. § 2071(f}; see also id. § 2071 note. 
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periodically all local strictures for consistency with the federal rules 
while permitting the councils to "modify or abrogate [all] procedures 
found inconsistent. "86 The JIA, therefore, assigned the councils a 
continuing duty to monitor local procedures that existed when it took· 
effect on December 1, 1988, and all procedures that are subsequently 
prescribed. 87 
In short, Congress intended that the JIA modernize, regularize, 
and open the national and local procedural amendment processes 
while restoring the primacy of national rule revision and limiting the 
proliferation of local requirements. Congress, thus, apparently meant 
to reinvigorate numerous procedural tenets, such as uniformity, sim-
plicity, and transsubstantivity, that animated the drafters of the origi-
nal federal rules in 1938. Before several of the Act's important 
aspects, particularly those pertaining to local procedural revision and 
proliferation, could be thoroughly implemented and before release of 
the report of the Federal Courts Study Committee commissioned by 
the 1988 legislation, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), chair of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, introduced an important bill that was the 
predecessor of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.88 
C. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
1. Background 
The developments that led to the introduction of the measure 
that eventually became the CJRA warrant comparatively thorough 
examination here because they inform understanding of the statute 
that Congress ultimately enacted. Treatment of that background in 
this article is somewhat attenuated, however, as a number of writers 
and entities have comprehensively considered the relevant history 
elsewhere.89 
Concerns about growing expense and delay in civil litigation led 
Senator Biden, the Foundation for Change, and the Brookings Institu-
tion to create a task force that was to evaluate the civil justice process 
and make suggestions for improvement.90 The task force, which in-
cluded a broad spectrum of federal court users, undertook that assess-
ment by scrutinizing the federal and state civil justice systems and 
commissioning several surveys conducted by Louis Harris and 
Associates. 
86. Id. § 332(d)(4); see also id. § 2071 note. 
87. See id. § 332(d)(4); see also id. § 2071 note. 
88. S. 2648, lOlst Cong. (1990). 
89. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 2; Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Summer 1991, at 105; Robel, supra note 2. 
90. I rely substantially in this paragraph on BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUC-
ING CosTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989). See also S. REP. No. 101-416, at 13-14 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6816. 
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The task force ascertained that there was much dissatisfaction 
among judges, attorneys, and parties with the federal civil justice pro-
cess.91 The task force found that increasing cost and delay in resolving 
civil litigation jeopardized open federal court access for numerous 
people and organizations92 and proposed that the federal districts ap-
ply mechanisms, principally involving judicial case management, dis-
covery, and ADR, to rectify or ameliorate these problems.93 
Senator Biden relied substantially on the task force's suggestions 
in drafting Senate Bill 2648,94 which he introduced in early 1990. The 
bill, which would have required each federal district to implement a 
number of mechanisms for decreasing cost and delay, proved to be 
somewhat controversial.95 Many federal judges had numerous con-
cerns about the proposed legislation. The jurists were most troubled 
because they considered the measure a congressional attempt to 
micromanage the federal courts, which avoided the ordinary rule 
amendment procedures, possibly threatening them and the efforts of 
the Federal Courts Study Committee that Congress had commis-
sioned, and which was introduced prior to adequate consultation with 
the judges.96 Indeed, the Judicial Conference responded to Senate 
Bill 2648 with a "Fourteen-Point Plan."97 After holding hearings, con-
ducting delicate negotiations with the Conference, and revising the 
legislation initially introduced, Congress passed the CJRA in Novem-
ber 1990.98 
The CJRA was, and remains, controversial for reasons mentioned 
above and numerous others. A number of experts have challenged 
the assertion that the federal courts have encountered troubling delay 
in resolving civil cases. Thorough 1990 assessments showed that there 
was less delay, especially in terms of time to disposition, than some 
claimed.99 Additional observers have suggested that, to the extent 
that courts experience delay, the phenomenon varies considerably 
from district to district. 100 A few critics assert that delay is a relative 
91. See BROOKINGS INST., supra note 90, at 1-2, 5-7. 
92. See id. at 5-7. 
93. See id. at 8-29. 
94. S. 2648, 101st Cong. (1990). 
95. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 4-6, 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806-08, 
6833-34; see also Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON 
D1sP. REsoL. 115, 128-29 (1991). 
96. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 4-6, 10, 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806-08, 
6813, 6833-34. 
97. See id. at 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6833-34; see also Robel, supra 
note 95, at 128-29. 
98. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 3-6, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6805-08. 
99. See TERENCE DUNWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF C1v1L 
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990); WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIO-
NALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990). 
100. See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1991, at 99; see also Robel, supra note 95, at 117-23. 
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notion.101 For instance, although certain resource-poor litigants may 
require more time for discovery to develop factual information impor-
tant in proving their cases, it might be improper to describe this tem-
poral need as delay that deserves remediation.102 Other observers 
claim that the statute was motivated too substantially by political con-
siderations or was insufficiently responsive to critical sources of cost 
and delay, mainly criminal dockets.103 
It is also important to understand that the 1988 and 1990 acts had 
quite different origins, sponsors, and purposes, although both pieces 
of legislation passed within a two-year time span. The JIA gestated 
for nearly a decade, emanated from Representative Robert Kas-
tenmeier's House Judiciary Subcommittee, and harkened back to the 
tenets that underlie the 1938 federal rules.104 Congress passed the 
CJRA in less than a year, and it came from Senator Biden's Senate 
Judiciary Committee and responded to concerns regarding the litiga-
tion explosion and litigation abuse, which find their clearest expres-
sion in the 1983 federal rule amendments.105 
2. The CIRA 
The CJRA commanded each federal district court to formulate a 
civil justice expense and delay reduction plan by December 1993.106 
The plans' purposes were "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil 
cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation manage-
ment, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil dis-
putes."107 The courts were to promulgate plans after scrutinizing 
reports and recommendations that advisory groups prepared for the 
districts.108 
These groups, which the districts named ninety days after adop-
tion of the CJRA, were to be balanced and include attorneys and 
other people representative of those who participate in civil litigation 
in the trial courts.109 The statute mandated that each group thor-
101. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 2; Robel, supra note 95, at 117-23; see also DUNWORTH 
& PACE, supra note 99. 
102. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992); see also Robel, supra note 95, at 121-22 (challenging relationship 
between delay reduction and increased access to justice). 
103. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 100, at 100-03; Mullenix, supra note 2, at 400-01; see also 
David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 123 (1983) 
(questioning whether litigation expenses are excessive). 
104. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra notes 25-29, 36-37, and accompanying text. 
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b)(l)). 
107. Id. § 471. 
108. See id. § 472. See generally JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL 
JusncE REFORM Acr IN P1LOT AND COMPARISON D1sTR1crs 13-26 (1996) [hereinafter RAND 
PILOT STUDY]; Barb L. Bettenhausen, Revolution or Restoration? District Advisory Groups 
Under the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act and the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 4 GEo. MASON L. 
REV. 297 (1996). 
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 478(b). 
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oughly evaluate the "state of the court's civil and criminal dockets," 
"identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on the 
court's resources," and delineate the "principal causes of cost and de-
lay in civil litigation" in the district.110 The CJRA also commanded 
every group, when formulating suggestions, to consider the specific 
needs and situations of the district, its parties, and their lawyers, while 
insuring that all of them contribute significantly to "reducing cost and 
delay and thereby facilitating access to the courts."111 
The districts, after receiving the groups' reports and recommen-
dations, were to assess them and confer with the groups, and then 
were to consider and could adopt the CJRA's eleven principles, guide-
lines, and techniques, and any other procedures that they deemed ap-
propriate to reduce cost or delay under the legislation's twelfth open-
ended provision.112 Section 473(a) of the CJRA affords six principles 
and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction: 
a system of case management tailored to each lawsuit's circumstances, 
early judicial participation to create timelines, discovery conferences, 
cooperative and voluntary discovery, strict limitations on discovery 
motions, and enhanced reliance on ADR.113 Section 473(b) provides 
five techniques for managing litigation and decreasing expense and 
delay: parties' joint presentation of a discovery case management 
plan, litigant representation at each pretrial conference by counsel 
with authority to bind a party regarding previously identified discus-
sion topics, a signature requirement for all requests by attorneys or 
parties for extension of deadlines for discovery completion and for 
trial postponement, early neutral evaluation, and the presence or 
availability by telephone of party representatives with binding settle-
ment authority during settlement conferences upon court notice.114 
None of the principles, guidelines, or techniques prescribed was 
novel. Congress based the eleven measures primarily on the Brook-
ings task force's recommendations, which in turn had been derived 
principally from procedures that many federal districts and states had 
applied or with which they had experimented.115 For example, numer-
ous districts had carefully monitored complex lawsuits and imposed 
restrictions on discovery motions, 116 while trial courts in practically all 
of the states had employed various forms of ADR.117 These phenom-
110. Id. § 472(c)(l). 
111. Id. § 472(c)(2)-(3). 
112. See id. §§ 472(a), 473(a)-(b). See generally Bettenhausen, supra note 108, at 300. 
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a). 
114. See id. § 473(b). 
115. See BROOKINGS INST., supra note 90, at 23; supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
116. See, e.g., E. DIST. OF NEw YoRK PLAN, supra note 49, at 2; WYOMING PLAN, supra note 
49, at 2; see also Subrin, supra note 24, at 2020-26; Edward D. Cavanagh, Congress' Failed At-
tempt to Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of the Civil Justice Reform Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 
1996, at 28. 
117. See supra note 38; see also Sherman, supra note 38. 
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ena suggest, therefore, that the CJRA's purposes, language, and re-
quirements were comparatively modest. 
The districts that adopted and implemented plans prior to De-
cember 31, 1991, qualified for designation as Early Implementation 
District Courts (EIDC), and the remaining courts had to promulgate 
plans by December 1993.118 The CJRA also instructed the Judicial 
Conference to identify ten districts, five of which served metropolitan 
areas, as pilot districts.119 The CJRA required the ten courts to pre-
scribe plans that included the six principles and guidelines of litigation 
management and cost and expense reduction by December 31, 
1991.12° Congress mandated that an "independent organization with 
expertise in the area of Federal court management" evaluate the pilot 
program and that the Judicial Conference submit to Congress a report 
and suggestions respecting the principles and guidelines.121 
The CJRA concomitantly created a demonstration program in 
which the Western District of Michigan and the Northern District of 
Ohio were to experiment with differentiated case management 
(DCM) while the Northern District of California, the Western District 
of Missouri, and the Northern District of West Virginia were to exper-
iment with a plethora of measures, including ADR, for decreasing 
cost and delay.122 The legislation required that the Judicial Confer-
ence assess the demonstration program and tender to Congress a re-
port on it.123 
In addition to the prescribed evaluations, the CJRA established 
institutions to oversee statutory implementation and assigned them 
rather general responsibilities. For instance, the legislation instructed 
circuit review committees, consisting of the chief circuit judge and all 
of the chief district judges in every circuit, to review all expense and 
delay reduction plans and advisory group reports and to make sugges-
tions for additions or changes that the committee considered neces-
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (implementation of plans). 
119. See id.; see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MAN-
AGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JusncE REFORM ACT 3-4, 15-18 (1996) [hereinafter RAND JCM 
STUDY]; RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 5-9. 
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note; see also supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
121. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note; see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE C1v1L JusTICE 
REFORM ACT OF 1990 FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF CosT 
AND DELA y ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND TECHNIQUES (1997), reprinted in 175 
F.R.D. 62 (1997) (hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]; JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., JusT, 
SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE 
CIVIL JusncE REFORM ACT (1996) (hereinafter RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. 
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (demonstration program); see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., 
AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUS-
TICE REFORM ACT (1996) (analyzing ADR) [hereinafter RAND ADR STUDY]. 
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note; see also DoNNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JuDICIAL 
CENTER REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND 
CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED 
UNDER THE CIVIL JusncE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997) (hereinafter FJC STUDY]; JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997). 
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sary to limit cost and delay in civil actions.124 The statute similarly 
required the Judicial Conference to review each plan and report, while 
empowering the Conference to request additional action if it deter-
mined that districts had inadequately responded to conditions on their 
dockets or to their advisory groups' recommendations.125 The CJRA 
also commanded all ninety-four districts to conduct annual assess-
ments. It required that courts consult with their advisory groups in 
analyzing the condition of the districts' criminal and civil dockets to 
ascertain whether additional effective actions might be instituted to 
decrease expense and delay and to improve the courts' litigation man-
agement practices.126 
In short, congressional passage of the 1990 CJRA was intended to 
encourage widespread district court experimentation that would lead 
to the discovery of efficacious procedures for reducing cost and delay 
in civil litigation. The statute's sponsors envisioned that reform insti-
tuted "from the 'bottom up"' would promote the creative develop-
ment of measures to decrease expense and delay while fostering 
consensus among federal court users about optimal procedures and 
productive exchange among those consumers.127 Finally, the legisla-
tion's advocates apparently intended it to be a modest reform, espe-
cially in the sense that the statutorily prescribed measures were 
premised substantially on mechanisms that many federal districts and 
states had adopted or with which they were experimenting. The sec-
ond section, which analyzes the CJRA's effectuation, finds that the 
overwhelming majority of districts cautiously implemented the 
statute. 
II. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION 
The CJRA's implementation, as witnessed in federal districts' 
promulgation and application of civil justice plans, is inextricably in-
tertwined with, and can be understood best by consulting, the JIA's 
effectuation as manifested in the national revision process that led to 
the 1993 federal rule amendments and in efforts meant to reform local 
procedural revision and treat proliferation. Most pertinent, the na-
tional rule revisors apparently felt compelled to accommodate ongo-
ing civil justice reform experimentation in certain important aspects of 
the 1993 federal rule amendments, while those assigned responsibili-
ties for limiting local procedural proliferation seemingly believed that 
they must defer to this experimentation that essentially suspended 
their work.128 
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 474(a). 
125. See id. § 474(b). 
126. See id. § 475; see also RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23. 
127. S. REP. No. 101-416, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806. 
128. See Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real 
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994) (suggesting revisors felt compelled to accommodate CJRA); infra 
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Congress predicated the JIA's passage on the accurate perception 
that proliferating local procedures had undermined important tenets, 
namely, uniformity and simplicity, and crafted the JIA in response to 
this particular difficulty.129 However, legislative concern over mount-
ing cost and delay in civil lawsuits prompted Congress to prescribe 
strictures in the CJRA that effectively discontinued implementation of 
the JIA's features that were intended to reduce proliferation. Be-
cause the 1988 JIA's effectuation enhances comprehension of the 
CJRA's implementation, the effectuation of the JIA is briefly 
evaluated. 
A. The JIA 
The assessment above suggests that requirements relating to local 
procedural change that the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act imposed 
have received comparatively little implementation. Therefore, this 
limited effectuation is examined before considering the national rule 
revision process, although both processes' implementation and that of 
civil justice reform are interwoven. 
1. Local Rule Revision Processes 
Nearly all of the ninety-four federal districts have now named lo-
cal rules committees to advise the courts on the adoption and modifi-
cation of local procedures, although some districts did not appoint the 
entities before they prescribed CJRA expense and delay reduction 
plans, and a few courts may even lack local advisory committees to-
day .130 A small number of districts have regularized and opened to 
public scrutiny processes for promulgating and amending local proce-
dures, and certain courts have in fact adopted new, or revised existing, 
local procedures pursuant to those processes. Very few local rules 
committees were actively involved in implementing civil justice 
reform.131 
An insignificant number of districts have apparently undertaken 
actions to implement the JIA's requirements regarding local proce-
note 137 and accompanying text (suggesting those responsible for limiting proliferation believed 
they must defer to experimentation). 
129. See supra notes 18, 39-54, 81-87, and accompanying text. 
130. For instance, the Eastern and Western Districts of North Carolina did not name local 
rules committees before adopting plans. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF N.C., CIVIL 
JusncE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5 (Oct. 1993); Letter from Sam Hamrick, 
CJRA Analyst, U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to Carl Tobias 
(Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with the author). The JIA imposed no requirements regarding commit-
tees' composition, so that certain committees may lack balance in terms of plaintiffs and defense 
interests, political views, race, and gender. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. But cf 
supra note 109 and accompanying text (requiring CJRA advisory groups to be balanced). 
131. A few districts attempted to keep their committees involved or named committee 
members to their advisory groups. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DIST. OF N.C., REPORT AND RECOMMENDED PLAN 111 (1992); see also Carl Tobias, 
Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89, 108 (1993). 
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dural proliferation. For instance, practically no courts have attempted 
to restrict the number of local rules applicable in the districts, much 
less instituted processes for monitoring individual judge procedures or 
modified any local procedures deemed to conflict with the federal 
rules or acts of Congress.132 
The circuit judicial councils, which the 1988 statute charged with 
responsibility for periodically reviewing and abrogating or modifying 
inconsistent local procedures adopted by districts or judges within the 
councils' purview,133 have attained little more success than the dis-
tricts in discharging their monitoring duties. The Judicial Council of 
the Seventh Circuit may be the sole council that has periodically eval-
uated local procedures prescribed by districts in the appeals court and 
abolished or altered the requirements that the council found in con-
flict.134 However, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council has recently con-
cluded a thoroughgoing review of local strictures prescribed in its 
fifteen districts and has suggested that the courts abrogate or change 
some procedures that it deemed inconsistent.135 
There are numerous reasons why the 1988 statute's requirements, 
particularly pertaining to local procedural proliferation, received com-
paratively limited effectuation. Most significant, the CJRA of 1990 
essentially discouraged efforts that the local rules committees and cir-
cuit councils might have undertaken to restrict proliferation by as-
signing overlapping responsibilities to federal districts and to the 
institutions-advisory groups and circuit review committees-whose 
creation the legislation prescribed.136 For instance, local rules com-
mittees had little reason to prescribe local rules when advisory groups 
and districts were developing new, possibly conflicting local require-
ments, while circuit review committees might have been understanda-
bly reluctant to review for inconsistency local rules that the CJRA 
apparently authorized. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council 
voted in 1994 to suspend additional review of local procedures that it 
had earlier commenced, pending the receipt of greater guidance from 
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law on whether the CJRA 
132. See Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 51. Very few courts have 
even implemented the analogous feature of Federal Rule 83's 1985 amendment. See supra notes 
41·42 and accompanying text (discussing 1985 amendment to Rule 83). 
133. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text; see also supra note 43 and accompanying 
text (imposing similar duties in Rule 83's 1985 revision). 
134. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45. 
135. See DISTRICT LOCAL RULES REVIEW COMM., REPORT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDI-
CIAL CouNCIL: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1997). See generally Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Re-
view of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1996); Carl Tobias, A Sixth Circuit Story, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
983, 988 (1996). 
136. See supra notes 108-11, 124-25, and accompanying text. 
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empowered districts to promulgate local procedur'es that conflicted 
with the federal rules.137 
The intrinsic tension between the objective of national uniformity 
and solicitude for local concerns may also explain why those features 
of the JIA relating to local procedural proliferation have not received 
particularly thorough effectuation. Federal district judges and local 
rules committees, consisting of local attorneys, apparently have been 
more concerned about the needs of local federal judges, lawyers, and 
litigants than about preserving and revitalizing a national, uniform 
procedural system.138 For instance, some districts excluded attorneys 
who were admitted to practice in states or districts other than those 
districts because of discrepancies in local bar admission strictures.139 
It is important to understand, however, that the judges, local rules 
committees, and circuit judicial councils that may have considered un-
dertaking local procedural review for conflicts with the federal rules 
and acts of Congress could have experienced difficulty in ascertaining 
precisely what constituted inconsistency, especially between local pro-
cedures and the federal requirements.14° Moreover, Congress appro-
priated no funding for the district judges or these entities, which have 
comparatively limited time and money for discharging numerous bur-
densome responsibilities, to complete the apparently resource-inten-
sive, onerous duties regarding local proliferation that Congress 
assigned.141 
2. National Rule Revision Process 
Implementation of the requirements that the JIA imposed on na-
tional rule amendment can be assessed by considering the revision 
process that yielded the 1993 changes in the federal rules. This pro-
cess was unusual in three important ways. First, it constituted the ini-
tial significant test of the mandates included in the 1988 statute. 
Second, the set of modifications was probably the most ambitious 
package of amendments formulated in the six-decade history of the 
137. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF 
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 4-5 (May 4, 1994); see also Tobias, supra note 
135. 
138. Most local committees will be more solicitous than the Federal Advisory Committee of 
local judges, counsel, and parties. See generally Marc S. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out 
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974). Many 
writers agree that the Committee has much expertise, even if they disagree about its exercise. 
See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 68; Carrington, supra note 73; Mullenix, supra note 73. 
139. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 643, 650 (1987); see also Coquillette et al., supra 
note 44, at 64. See generally SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS TO THE FED. 
COURTS, NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
FEDERAL COURTS ON PRO HAc VICE ADMISSIONS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS, reprinted in 169 
F.R.D. 390 (1996); Carl Tobias, Federal Court Procedural Reform, 52 MoNT. L. REv. 433, 436 
n.14 (1991). 
140. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45; Telephone Interview 
with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 51. See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 64. 
141. See Tobias, supra note 135. 
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federal rules.142 Third, the rule revisors' perception that they must 
accommodate ongoing civil justice reform experimentation mandated 
by the CJRA may have made the rule amendment process extremely 
unusual.143 
Despite these circumstances, the process that led to the promul-
gation of the 1993 rule revisions warrants evaluation because analysis 
informs understanding of the national amendment process and the 
present status of the tenets and tensions involving the 1988 and 1990 
statutes. The Advisory Committee effectuated the JIA by first pro-
posing revisions in eighteen federal rules during 1991;144 however, that 
entity and its changes to Rule 11 and in Rule 26 that impose automatic 
disclosure are emphasized. The Advisory Committee was principally 
responsible for formulating the two amendments that were the most 
controversial modifications, and their examination increases compre-
hension of the basic procedural precepts, of inherent conflicts among 
certain tenets, and of issues that are critical to harmonizing the JIA 
and the CJRA. 
Rule 11 particularly is addressed because its 1983 amendment 
had proved to be the most controversial change in the civil rules' his-
tory and represented a failed effort to address perceived litigation 
abuses that the open-ended, flexible procedural regime of the 1938 
rules seemingly fostered.145 The provision, accordingly, illustrates ten-
sions between significant procedural precepts. The process from 
which the 1993 revision resulted also typifies the kind of open rule 
revision that Congress apparently envisioned in passing the JIA. 
Automatic disclosure is emphasized because numerous respected 
experts on federal civil practice currently think that a number of diffi-
culties with discovery, such as discovery abuse, threaten civil litiga-
tion 146 and because the provision prescribing disclosure was probably 
the most controversial formal proposal to change the rules ever devel-
oped. The 1993 amendment imposing disclosure shows how imple-
142. Evaluating the efficacy of the revisions that have been in effect for less than five years 
could be premature. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Rule 
23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 52 (1967) (citing former Advisory Committee Reporter's view that one-genera-
tion time frame is appropriate for evaluating efficacy of federal rule amendments); Arthur R. 
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action 
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 677 (1979) (same). 
143. See Carrington, supra note 128. 
144. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]; 
see also Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 1. 
145. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 
IowA L. REv. 1775, 1775 (1992); Walker, supra note 68, at 455-59. 
146. See, e.g., Committee on Discovery, New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on Discovery 
Under Rule 26(b)(l), in 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579; Ralph K. 
Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992). But see Linda S. Mul-
lenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Conse-
quences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1392 (1994). 
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mentation of the JIA's commands governing national rule revision 
and congressional inability to reconcile the two statutes' effectuation 
worsened local proliferation, additionally undermined national uni-
formity and simplicity, and increased cost and delay. The national 
amendment process is initially afforded brief, general treatment. 147 
a. General Description 
The national rule amendment institutions, particularly the entities 
principally responsible for studying federal civil procedure and devel-
oping proposed modifications, appeared to implement efficaciously 
and faithfully the strictures included in the JIA governing rule revi-
sion. They instituted amendment procedures that were premised sub-
stantially on the process of notice-comment administrative rulemaking 
that federal agencies follow under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
During August 1991, the Advisory Committee issued a prelimi-
nary draft of proposed amendments to eighteen federal rules.148 It 
requested and secured broad input from the public on the proposals in 
writing and during two public hearings.149 The Committee was quite 
responsive to these public suggestions and attempted to improve the 
proposed revisions, especially the changes that were most controver-
sial. The Committee even reversed the ordinary sequence by solicit-
ing public input on the prospect of revision before drafting a proposal 
to modify Rule 11.150 
The other institutions in the rule amendment hierarchy made 
only one major alteration in the Committee's ultimate work product 
on Rule 11 and a small number of additional changes, thereby exhibit-
ing deference to the Committee and to entities below them in that 
hierarchy.151 More specifically, the Supreme Court continued its prac-
tice of acceding to the expertise of these institutions and may have 
deferred more substantially than ever.152 Congress closely analyzed 
the 1993 revisions, and the House of Representatives passed legisla-
tion that would have deleted automatic disclosure, but Congress per-
mitted the whole set of amendments to take effect on December 1, 
1993, by not acting.153 
147. I rely substantially in my treatment of amended Rules 11 and 26 on Carl Tobias, The 
Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L. REv. 127 (1994). 
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
149. See William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1993); Tobias, supra note 145, at 1778; see 
also Tobias supra note 69, at 862-63. 
150. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Advisory Comm. on the Civil Rules, Call for Writ-
ten Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules as Amended 
in 1983, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments]. 
151. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 185 (1994). 
152. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND FoRMs, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 403 (1993) (submitting very deferential 
transmittal letter) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS]. 
153. See Hughes, supra note 149, at 2. 
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The Rule 11 revision process was replete with ironies, which re-
flect back on the 1938 tenets.154 The Advisory Committee published a 
preliminary draft proposal to revise the 1983 amendment a mere eight 
years after the rule revisors had substantially modified the provision. 
The Committee's preliminary draft unfortunately did not treat numer-
ous difficulties, such as satellite litigation and chilling effects, that the 
1983 modification of Rule 11 imposed.155 
Few interests that the proposal would have affected were satisfied 
with it. For example, the imposition of a continuing duty to withdraw 
small fragments of papers when they lost merit and the possibility of 
having to pay large monetary sanctions discouraged parties with lim-
ited resources.156 The express inclusion of denials as components of 
papers that must comply with the rule and the reduced prospect of 
securing attorney's fees for rule violations bothered defense coun-
sel.157 The lack of clarity in the proposal's wording troubled many 
attorneys and litigants.158 A number of individuals and groups criti-
cized the preliminary draft, although the Advisory Committee thor-
oughly evaluated the 1983 amendment, solicited and closely examined 
significant public input on the prospect of amendment before sug-
gesting change, and carefully drafted a proposal that it thought would 
be responsive to the needs of everyone involved in federal civil 
litigation.159 
The Advisory Committee crafted several new drafts of the initial 
proposal, which meant that the final version that it prepared in May 
1992 for the Standing Committee constituted a significant improve-
ment. For example, this iteration substantially narrowed the continu-
ing duty and parsed less finely the idea of a paper.160 The changes in 
the first draft could be ascribed to the Committee's conscientious ex-
amination of much written public comment, consideration of oral in-
put at several public hearings, and writing of the fairest, clearest, most 
efficacious revision conceivable.161 The Committee's work in devel-
154. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra note 135; Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Rounde-
lay, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 236. 
155. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 236; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 862-65. See gener-
ally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 475, 484-86 (1991). 
156. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 237. See generally Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89); Vairo, supra note 155, at 484-86. 
157. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 237. See generally Vairo, supra note 155, at 495-500. 
158. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 238; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 894-95; Vairo, 
supra note 155, at 495-500. · 
159. See Tobias, supra note 69, at 861-65; see also Call for Comments, supra note 150, at 345. 
160. Compare Tobias, supra note 69, at 866-71 (discussing the continuing duty in the prelim-
inary draft), with FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (1993 amendment). See also FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory 
committee's note (1993 amendment); Tobias, supra note 147, at 137. 
161. See Tobias, supra note 151; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 859-65. 
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oping the final draft represented the type of open, responsive revision 
and reasoned decision making that Congress envisioned in changing 
the rule amendment process in the 1988 statute.162 
Notwithstanding the improvements in the Rule 11 proposal and 
the Committee's gargantuan efforts, certain critics continued opposing 
the 1983 provision's amendment.163 The most prominent among these 
observers was Justice Antonin Scalia, who authored a vociferous dis-
sent to the Supreme Court's transmittal of amended Rule 11.164 The 
dissent contended that promulgation of revised Rule 11 would "elimi-
nate a significant and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation" and 
argued that the amendment would make Rule 11 toothless because it 
would give judges discretion to levy sanctions, disfavor compensation 
for litigation costs, and provide safe harbors which allow parties that 
contravene the provision to avoid sanctions altogether.165 Despite 
these criticisms, those entities responsible for amending the rules, 
whose membership then consisted principally of federal judges, ap-
peared to think that a stricter revision's possible disadvantages, 
namely satellite litigation and chilling meritorious cases, overrode its 
benefits, such as discouraging frivolous lawsuits.166 
Federal judges' support for amending Rule 11 appeared impor-
tant to congressional consideration of the revision that the Court 
transmitted. Most members of Congress seemed to find that they 
could not improve on many features of the rule changes forwarded.167 
These modifications represented the well-informed opinion of the rule 
revision institutions and their expert advisers or constituted the most 
efficacious means of responding to the myriad factual situations that 
Rule 11 addresses. For instance, the amendment employed words, 
such as "reasonable" and "likely," which are the clearest, fairest 
162. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. See generally Walker, supra note 68. 
163. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 151, at 186-87. 
164. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 507-10 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); see also id., reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 419-24 (1993) (transmitting revised Rule 
11). 
165. Id. at 507-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Tobias, supra note 151, at 186-87 (affording 
additional analysis of dissent). 
166. See Tobias, supra note 151, at 188. 
167. Illustrative was Representative William Hughes (D-N.J.), Chair of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee with responsibility for monitoring rule revision, who deferred to the federal judi-
ciary because he found much support for revision and for limiting the satellite litigation fostered 
by the 1983 rule. See Federal Courts: Bill to Delete Discovery Rule Reported to House Commit-
tee, Daily Rep. for Executives, Reg., Econ. and Law (BNA) (Aug. 6, 1993), available in LEXIS, 
BNA Library, BNABUS File. Other members of Congress evinced less deference, introducing 
bills that would have postponed the amendment's effective date for one year. See H.R. 2979, 
103d Cong. (1993) (delaying effective date of the proposed amendments to Rule 11); S. 1382, 
103d Cong. (1993) (same); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. (1993) (permitting certain proposed 
rules of civil procedure with modifications to take effect). 
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phrasing that can treat the inherently fact-specific questions impli-
cated by sanctions motions.168 
The amendment process was responsive to the complications en-
gendered by the 1983 revision and to public comment, producing a 
balanced change in Rule 11. For example, the 1993 revision signifi-
cantly decreased the incentives to invoke the provision by affording 
safe harbors and by empowering judges to exercise discretion in 
choosing whether to sanction and in selecting appropriate sanc-
tions.169 The Advisory Committee correspondingly deleted some bur-
densome requirements from the preliminary draft, such as the 
continuing duty.170 The revisors reduced incentives for invoking Rule 
11 and the Committee omitted these onerous requirements, despite 
remaining concerns about deterring frivolous litigation that Justice 
Scalia articulated.171 
The rule revision entities, however, retained some incentives for 
employing Rule 11. For instance, revised Rule 11 permits judges to 
award litigants who file Rule 11 motions the expenses of prevailing 
and to impose sanctions of attorney's fees in certain circumstances.172 
The revisors concomitantly used unclear or very general phrasing, 
such as "nonfrivolous" and "appropriate sanctions," which will inevi-
tably promote inconsistent interpretation and satellite litigation.173 
In short, the new Rule 11 may have been imperfect, but it greatly 
improved the 1983 version and was much better than the Advisory 
Committee's first draft. The 1993 rule should also decrease incentives 
to employ Rule 11, reduce cost and delay ascribed to satellite litiga-
tion, and limit chilling effects. Moreover, the amendment was a feasi-
ble compromise in light of the daunting restraints under which the 
rule revisors labored, such as the importance of satisfying the different 
constituencies affected by the provision. 
Perhaps the best explanation for Rule ll's 1993 revision is that 
many judges apparently found that the 1983 provision had achieved as 
much as could reasonably be attained by encouraging attorneys and 
litigants to undertake reasonable prefiling inquiries and by discourag-
ing pursuit of frivolous cases. The revision entities might also have 
determined that the provision's rigorous application could not support 
the expenditure of scarce resources of judges, attorneys, and parties 
168. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(a)-(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21; see also Tobias, supra 
note 145, at 1791. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 
93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). 
169. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra note 
145, at 1783-88. 
170. See Tobias, supra note 151, at 192-96; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 866-71. 
171. See supra notes 165-66, 169, and accompanying text. 
172. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra note 
145, at 1787-88. 
173. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll(a)-(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21; see also Tobias, supra 
note 151, at 196-201, 209-14. 
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on satellite litigation that the rule entails. Important as well may have 
been the perception among judges, counsel, and parties that discovery 
was a larger difficulty with civil litigation that required more reform 
and had greater prospects for actual improvement. 
ii. Amended Rule 26 
The process of amending Federal Rule 26 to prescribe automatic 
disclosure was similarly ironic.174 The Advisory Committee seemed to 
forget the troubling results of its 1983 revision of Rule 11. Even 
though the Committee had very limited empirical data on how the 
1938 Rule 11 operated, the Committee significantly changed the origi-
nal rule, and this 1983 modification ultimately became the most con-
troversial revision in the rules' half-century history.175 
Notwithstanding the dearth of empirical information showing the 
existence of much discovery abuse, the difficulty that disclosure pri-
marily addresses,176 and the lack of experimentation with, and assess-
ment of, automatic disclosure, 177 the Advisory Committee published a 
preliminary draft during 1991 that might have significantly altered the 
process of discovery.178 The draft would have mandated that plaintiffs 
and defendants disclose prior to discovery much material that was 
likely to bear "significantly on any claim or defense."179 The Commit-
tee published the proposal, although virtually no federal districts had 
experimented with automatic disclosure,180 two of disclosure's earliest 
proponents had recommended that a national rule be adopted only 
after much testing, 181 and congressional passage of the CJRA demon-
strated legislative concern that experimentation occur before discov-
ery underwent great change.182 Of the some twenty districts that 
issued civil justice plans by December 31, 1991, to qualify for designa-
tion as Early Implementation District Courts (EID Cs) under the 
CJRA, and that decided to impose disclosure, practically all depended 
174. I rely substantially in this subsection on Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil 
Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993); Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The 
Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992); Tobias, supra note 147; Winter, supra note 146. 
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also Burbank, supra note 68, at 1927-28 
(suggesting little empirical data on 1938 version's operation). 
176. See Mullenix, supra note 146, at 1432; Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse?, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 649, 653 (1989). 
177. A mere three federal districts had experimented with disclosure. See Bell et al., supra 
note 174, at 17-18; Mullenix, supra note 73, at 810, 813-21. 
178. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 144, at 87. 
179. Preliminary Draft, supra note 144, at 87-88. 
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
181. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Pro-
posals for Change, 31 V AND. L. REv. 1295, 1361 (1978); William W Schwarzer, The Federal 
Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. P1rr. L. REV. 703, 723 (1989). 
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994). See generally Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimenta-
tion with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1993). 
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heavily on the phrasing included in the Committee's preliminary 
draft.183 
No formal rule amendment proposal has received so much criti-
cism from such a broad spectrum of federal court users.184 Over the 
course of a half-year comment period and during public hearings, nu-
merous elements of the organized bar and many additional interests 
opposed the proposal because it lacked clarity, could have imposed 
another layer of discovery, involved ethical problems, and would in-
crease costs.185 Upon conclusion of the February 1992 Atlanta hear-
ing on the 1991 set of proposed amendments, the Advisory 
Committee responded to this groundswell of public opposition by jet-
tisoning the automatic disclosure preliminary draft and apparently de-
ferring to experimentation with disclosure under the CJRA that was 
being conducted in numerous districts.186 The Committee seemed to 
think for a short time that experimentation with the disclosure mecha-
nism in local districts was better than national application of the rela-
tively untested and controversial mechanism.187 
Less than two months thereafter, the Advisory Committee re-
versed its earlier view, absent additional public input and without ex-
planation.188 Six members of the Committee, at the instigation of 
Second Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, a persuasive proponent of au-
tomatic disclosure, 189 convinced the rest to reevaluate the issue.190 At 
an April 1992 session of the Committee, members resurrected the pro-
posal, imposing the basic requirements that litigants disclose "discov-
erable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity 
in the pleadings" and "all documents, data compilations and tangible 
things" having such relevance.191 The Committee also authorized dis-
tricts to vary the disclosure requirements in the federal provision or 
eschew them totally, which seemingly was an effort to accommodate 
ongoing civil justice reform experimentation.192 
183. See, e.g., MONTANA PLAN, supra note 52, at 15-16; E. DIST. OF NEW YORK PLAN, supra 
note 49, at 4-5; cf Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56 
(1992) (listing 34 EIDCs); see also 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (prescribing EIDCs); Preliminary Draft, 
supra note 144, at 87 (presenting Committee's early draft). 
184. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, 146 F.R.D. at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Accord 
Bell et al., supra note 174, at 28-32; Ann Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share: Judges Back Radi-
cal Discovery Rule, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, at 1. 
185. See Tobias, supra note 174, at 141; Bell et al., supra note 174, at 28-32. 
186. See Bell et al., supra note 174, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 146, at 268; Randall 
Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 1. 
187. See Bell et al., supra note 174, at 34-35; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12. 
188. See Bell et al., supra note 174, at 35. 
189. See Winter, supra note 146, at 268. 
190. See Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 
6; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12. 
191. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 431. 
192. See 146 F.R.D. at 431-32; see also Bell et al., supra note 174, at 35-39; Carrington, supra 
note 128. But see Winter, supra note 146, at 269. 
No. 2] CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET 577 
Justice Scalia's dissent from transmittal of the disclosure revision 
observed that the Committee might have found too prolonged the 
CJRA's schedule for experimentation, "preferring instead to subject 
the entire federal judicial system at once to an extreme, costly, and 
essentially untested revision of a major component of civil litiga-
tion. "193 The Committee members voiced a principled defense of the 
determination to change course two times within six weeks. They as-
serted that discovery was not operating efficaciously, that maintaining 
the status quo was not acceptable, and that the bar's self-interest pre-
cluded constructive change.194 The Committee seemed to understand 
that the protracted three-year rule amendment process imposed in the 
JIA meant that its withdrawal of the disclosure proposal would have 
essentially postponed judicially required discovery reform for much of 
the 1990s.195 Some observers even described the about-face as a des-
perate attempt to prevent the erosion of the judiciary's influence on 
procedure by congressional statutes, namely, the CJRA, and executive 
branch civil justice reform efforts, such as Executive Order 12,778.196 
The other institutions in the rule amendment hierarchy approved 
the Committee proposal, despite mounting criticism, especially from 
the bar. The Supreme Court transmitted the disclosure revision with-
out modification, although three Justices dissented.197 A majority of 
the Court apparently considered the core concept of disclosure suffi-
ciently important and workable and the need for discovery reform so 
critical that transmittal was warranted. Justice Scalia penned an 
acerbic dissent in which he asserted that the disclosure revision "adds 
a further layer of discovery" and "does not fit comfortably within the 
American judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to de-
velop the facts before a neutral decisionmaker. "198 
Once the Court had transmitted the amendment, virtually every 
segment of the bar and numerous other interests, encompassing indi-
viduals and entities as diverse as civil rights plaintiffs and corpora-
tions, attempted to convince Congress to eliminate the disclosure 
revision. In the summer of 1993, the House and Senate Judiciary 
193. AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
194. See Pelham, supra note 190, at 6; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12; see also Bell et al., 
supra note 174, at 35-39. The last observation illuminates another irony. Much of the organized 
bar seemed to oppose the disclosure proposal and to agree that many problems attend modern 
discovery. See Pelham, supra note 190, at 6; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12; see also Winter, 
supra note 146. 
195. Had Congress omitted disclosure, the revisors would have had to recommence the 
three-year process. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994); see also Samborn, supra note 186, at 12. 
196. See Samborn, supra note 186, at 12; see also Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 
(1992), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. See generally Tobias, supra note 102 (describing congres-
sional reforms); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521 
(1993) (describing executive initiatives). 
197. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431 (1993); id. at 507, 
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
198. Id., reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 510-11 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Committees conducted hearings on automatic disclosure.199 Repre-
sentative William J. Hughes, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Court Administration and Intellectual Property, guided 
through the House legislation that would have deleted disclosure, and 
the House passed it by voice vote on November 3, 1993.200 The Sen-
ate surprisingly failed to adopt the measure at the eleventh hour 
before recessing, principally because civil rights organizations, plain-
tiffs' trial lawyers, and numerous defense counsel and defense inter-
ests could not craft a satisfactory compromise that would have 
accommodated their concerns about the amendments governing dis-
closure, Rule 11, and presumptive discovery limitations.201 
During the period immediately after the Senate recessed without 
passing the bill, there was much confusion and uncertainty in many of 
the ninety-four districts, particularly those fifty courts that were hurry-
ing to satisfy the December 1, 1993, deadline by which the CJRA 
mandated that they adopt civil justice plans and on which the federal 
disclosure requirements became effective.202 Because numerous 
courts expected Congress to reject the federal disclosure amendment 
and failed to implement other options, the districts had to adopt last-
minute alternatives. Threats to revitalize the disclosure bill, which 
persisted even after Congress reconvened in late January 1994, wors-
ened the ongoing confusion.203 
These courts and most of the EIDCs, many of which in 1991 had 
instituted variations of automatic disclosure that conflicted with the 
new federal amendment,204 implemented a plethora of actions. A 
substantial number of the districts issued or revised civil justice plans, 
adopted general and special orders, and published new, or changed 
existing, local rules.205 Numerous non-EIDCs opted out, totally es-
chewing the new federal revision. They prescribed provisions that de-
parted from the federal strictures or discontinued application of the 
federal amendment until their judges, advisory groups or bars, or 
Congress could evaluate that procedure.206 Some EIDCs maintained 
different variations of automatic disclosure, which in turn conflicted 
199. See Hughes, supra note 149, at 3-4, 9-10. 
200. See 139 CoNG. REc. H8745-47 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993); see also Hughes, supra note 149, 
at 10; Randall Sambom, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3. 
201. See Sam born, supra note 200, at 3; see also Randall Sambom, Derailing the Rules, 
NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993, at 1 (analyzing diverse coalition that lobbied Congress). For example, 
civil rights groups refused to compromise on amended Rule 11, while the plaintiffs' bar would 
not separate disclosure and presumptive limits. 
202. See Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure: Let It Be, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at 25; see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994) (implementation of plans) (affording statutory deadlines). 
203. This assertion is premised on telephone conversations with numerous individuals who 
are familiar with the legislative machinations. 
204. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
205. A few even relied on the Rules Enabling Act's emergency clause. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2071(e). See, e.g., S.D. IND. R. 26.3 (invoking emergency clause); D. Mo. R. 104.1 (same). 
206. See, e.g., D. ME. R. 18(g); E.D. LA. R. 6.06E (amended Dec. 1, 1993); see also DONNA 
STJENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
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with the federal revision, or continued to reject disclosure com-
pletely.207 Nearly a majority of the districts ultimately chose not to 
apply the federal requirements.208 
Senate inability to pass the bill eliminating disclosure and this ac-
tivity led to considerable complication and consternation in many 
courts. For example, numerous attorneys and parties encountered 
problems finding all of the applicable procedures, determining which 
measures in fact governed and when they took effect, and understand-
ing and complying with the new strictures.209 The application of in-
consistent requirements complicated participation in federal civil 
litigation for counsel and entities, such as government lawyers and 
public interest groups that litigate in multiple districts, and tested the 
patience of judges and attorneys for conflicting procedures.210 
After the districts charted, instituted, and publicized particular 
courses of action to address automatic disclosure, the circumstances 
clarified and stabilized, and most judges, counsel, and clients seem-
ingly became accustomed to the applicable procedures.211 Numerous 
districts had attained a measure of clarity and certainty by the conclu-
sion of 1993, and nearly all of the remaining districts had ameliorated 
the complications by mid-1994.212 
The above assessment of automatic disclosure's effectuation sug-
gests that the experience eroded uniformity, simplicity, and transsub-
stantivity, while increasing cost and delay. Disclosure's actual ap-
plication in numerous specific cases has apparently had analogous im-
pacts. For example, the inexact nature of the information that parties 
are to reveal and disclosure's imposition of another discovery layer 
mean that disclosure has increased expense, and perhaps delay, in a 
number of circumstances.213 
CouRTS (1996); John Flynn Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, Is "Source of Confu-
sion": Critics, Cm. DAILY L. BuLL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17. 
207. See, e.g., Order of the United States District Court of Montana (Jan. 25, 1994); Order of 
the United States District Court of the Northern District of Georgia (Feb. 26, 1994). 
208. See SnENSTRA, supra note 206, at 4-5; see also Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Half 
of Districts Opt out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5; Rooney, supra note 206. 
209. See Tobias, supra note 202. 
210. The CJRA Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York urged the rule revis-
ors to observe a "three-year moratorium on affected national rules so that each district can have 
a fair opportunity to assess reforms at the local level." Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, 
Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York, to Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 3, 1992) 
(on file with author); see also Samborn, supra note 186, at 1. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, 
Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 856 
(1993). 
211. These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with the 
circumstances in numerous districts. 
212. These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with the 
circumstances in numerous districts. 
213. The assertions in this paragraph are premised on conversations with numerous individ-
uals familiar with disclosure and civil justice reform. See also infra notes 220-23 and accompany-
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It may be premature to posit definitive conclusions about 
whether any-or which-of the differing automatic disclosure meas-
ures are efficacious. A minuscule number of courts that implemented 
disclosure for the longest period have applied strictures analogous to 
the new federal revision, and the districts might not have experi-
mented with, much less evaluated, the technique for sufficient time to 
yield very conclusive assessments regarding efficacy.214 
Early anecdotal information indicated that some EIDCs encoun-
tered few problems employing the mechanism, particularly in compar-
atively simple lawsuits or when the disclosure was highly 
generalized.215 Additional anecdotal information showed that lawyers 
and litigants who have had experience with automatic disclosure could 
comply rather easily because disclosure effectively demanded their 
earlier involvement in certain activities, especially document retrieval 
and labeling.216 Disclosure, by requiring early automatic exchange of 
important information, may save resources, for example, that might 
have been expended on formal discovery and could expedite settle-
ment. The RAND Corporation's study of automatic disclosure's ap-
plication in the pilot and comparison districts unfortunately proved to 
be equally inconclusive as the earlier assessments of the procedure. 
Although RAND undertook a carefully controlled, well-defined anal-
ysis, it ascertained that disclosure had no measurable impact on cost 
or delay in civil litigation.217 
ing text (suggesting provision in specific cases for judicial modification or litigant stipulation 
additionally erodes uniformity and simplicity and increases cost and delay). 
214. Most of the EIDCs only implemented disclosure during 1992, and few rigorously ana-
lyzed its efficacy. See Tobias, supra note 147, at 144-45; Samborn, supra note 186, at l; see also 
1994 CIVIL JusncE REFORM Acr ADVISORY GROUP OF THEE. DIST. OF N.Y. ANN. REP. 3, 5-8 
(affording valuable assessment reflecting ambivalence about disclosure's efficacy). 
215. These included the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona, Massa-
chusetts, and Montana. This evidence was derived from conversations with many individuals 
who are familiar with civil justice reform in those districts. See also Carl Tobias, More on Federal 
Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REv. 357, 363 (1993); Samborn, supra note 186, at 
12. Discovery is most problematic and requires the most efficacious disclosure in complex law-
suits and when litigants need specific information. These ideas are premised on the conversa-
tions supra. Accord Bell et al., supra note 174, at 39-42; Winter, supra note 146, at 268. 
216. These ideas are premised on the conversations supra note 215. See also Samborn, 
supra note 186, at 1. 
217. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 17; see also James S. Kakalik et 
al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 
B.C. L. REv. 613, 679 (1998) (affording further analysis of disclosure finding "no strong evidence 
that a policy of early mandatory disclosure reduced lawyer work time or time to disposition"); 
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 534-35 (1998) (affording further analysis of 
discovery finding attorneys' perception that disclosure decreased expense and delay and that 
actual disposition times corroborated finding regarding delay). These results are disappointing 
because the 1993 federal disclosure provision afforded courts sufficient flexibility to experiment 
with many disclosure schemes that appeared adequate in number and diverse enough to provide 
a sense of the measure's efficacy. Moreover, many districts instituted measures for evaluating 
the disclosure techniques' efficacy. See, e.g., 1993 ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRicr 
COURT FOR THE E. DISTRicr OF p A. ANN. REP. 6-8; REPORT ON THE IMPAcr OF THE CosT AND 
DELAY REDUcrION PLAN ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRicr COURT FOR THE SOUTH-
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In short, the debate involving disclosure's effectiveness cannot be 
conclusively resolved today; however, the technique apparently oper-
ates most efficaciously in limited, discrete contexts. Disclosure's effec-
tuation clearly tested the tolerance for confusion and inconsistency of 
judges, attorneys, and parties, while undermining uniformity and sim-
plicity and increasing cost and delay. 
iii. A Miscellany of Procedures 
The package of proposals in the Advisory Committee's August 
1991 preliminary draft included other measures that require compara-
tively terse treatment because they involve issues that are less impor-
tant to this article. The rule revisors omitted or withdrew a few of 
these proposals over the course of the revision process, while addi-
tional ones were components of the 1993 amendments that became 
effective on December 1, 1993. 
The most significant proposal that did not take effect was a 
change in Rule 83, which would have prescribed local procedural ex-
perimentation. The proposal authorized districts with Judicial Confer-
ence approval to adopt for not greater than five years experimental 
local rules that conflict with federal rules.218 The Advisory Commit-
tee's withdrawal of the proposal, out of deference to continuing CJRA 
experimentation, led to the loss of a valuable means of carefully bal-
ancing the need for experimentation to discover effective measures 
with the difficulties, such as expense, which inconsistent local proce-
dures can foster.219 
The 1993 revisions that imposed presumptive numerical limita-
tions on interrogatories and depositions are also relevant to the issues 
examined in this article.220 The provisions, which permit local varia-
tion and allow judges and parties to change the procedures in particu-
lar lawsuits, resemble, and have effects analogous to, the federal 
automatic disclosure amendment.221 For instance, the strictures cov-
ering presumptive limits on depositions and interrogatories have 
prompted a number of courts to opt out of, or to modify, the federal 
requirements, thereby undermining uniformity and simplicity and in-
creasing cost and delay.222 A few changes in Rule 16 governing pre-
ERN D1sTR1cr OF TEXAS, available in 1993 WL 468314 (C.J.R.A.), at *7-9 (Apr. 6, 1993); see also 
28 u.s.c. § 475 (1994) . 
. 218. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 144, at 152. 
219. Compare id. with The Judicial Conference of the United States Proposed Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, at Table of Contents (1992) (deleting pro-
posed amendment of Rule 83). 
220. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A), 33(a). 
221. Presumptive limits raise issues analogous to automatic disclosure. Most important is 
the provision in specific cases for judicial modification and litigant stipulation. 
222. See, e.g., Order of the United States District Court of Montana (Jan. 25, 1994) (main-
taining current local rule imposing presumptive limit on interrogatories that departs from Fed-
eral Rule until the district formally reviews its Civil Justice Delay Reduction Plan); General 
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trial conferences, which allow local option in certain circumstances 
and alteration of time restraints in individual cases, could have simi-
larly reduced uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and in-
creased expense. 223 
In sum, the JIA's strictures covering local procedural amendment 
and proliferation received little effectuation because the CJRA essen-
tially discontinued implementation. Effectuation of the JIA's require-
ments relating to national rule revision, as manifested in Federal Rule 
ll's 1993 modification, exemplifies the kind of amendment process 
that Congress seemingly contemplated when passing the JIA and illus-
trates the tensions between important procedural precepts. The 1988 
legislation's implementation, as witnessed in the provision prescribing 
automatic disclosure, demonstrates how the JIA's strictures, and con-
gressional failure to reconcile them with the CJRA's requirements, 
exacerbated local proliferation, additionally eroding national uniform-
ity and simplicity and imposing greater cost and delay. 
B. Implementation of the CJ RA 
In this subsection, certain disadvantages that attended the 
CJRA's implementation are initially considered. For instance, diffi-
culties involved the entities that the CJRA assigned responsibility for 
effectuating the legislation, for monitoring that implementation, and 
for evaluating the efficacy of procedures in reducing expense and de-
lay that the ninety-four districts applied. Legislative provision for na-
tionwide experimentation, internal statutory inconsistency, and the 
CJRA's encouragement of districts to prescribe conflicting strictures 
correspondingly undermined uniformity and simplicity while increas-
ing cost and delay. The subsection then analyzes positive features of 
the CJRA's effectuation, emphasizing those experimental measures 
that saved expense or time. It concludes with lessons derived from the 
seven-year effort. Throughout the evaluation, the EIDCs' experience 
is stressed because the thirty-four courts experimented much longer 
and their work received considerably more assessment. Many of the 
remaining sixty districts concomitantly adopted mechanisms that rep-
licated or resembled those that the EIDCs prescribed. 
Order No. 40 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York in the 
Matter of Local Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 14, 1993). 
223. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 427-28 (1993) (text of 
amended Rule 16(b) as transmitted by the Supreme Court); see also id. at 478-79 (demonstrating 
that 1993 amendment to Rule 54(d)(2)(B) and (D) similarly prescribed local option); D. Mo. R. 
104.1; S.D. IND. R. 26.3. 
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1. Detrimental Aspects 
a. Relevant Entities 
i. Implementing Entities 
Congress meant for the CJRA to assemble a broad spectrum of 
interests in the districts that would develop from the bottom up inno-
vative expense and delay reduction procedures that would be respon-
sive to all involved in civil litigation.224 However, Congress selected 
instrumentalities to implement the statute and assigned them respon-
sibilities that eroded uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity and 
increased cost and delay, partly by encouraging the proliferation of 
local procedures. 
The CJRA required that judges in each district promulgate a civil 
justice plan after considering a report and recommendations prepared 
by an advisory group.225 The legislative mandate that chief district 
judges name the entities, the groups as selected, and the CJRA's com-
mands as effectuated had impacts that undermined the basic tenets. 
Some groups lacked balance, including, for example, large numbers of 
defense interests or insufficient representatives of those having few 
resources.226 The statutory command that each group consider its dis-
trict's needs and situation in assembling the report and suggestions 
apparently prompted a number of groups to develop recommenda-
tions that evinced more solicitude for local judges, attorneys, and par-
ties than for national uniformity and simplicity, and that varied 
significantly.227 
· u. Monitoring Entities 
Congress designated entities to oversee CJRA effectuation and 
assigned them comparatively generalized, unclear responsibilities that 
substantially limited the possibility that the instrumentalities would 
meaningfully treat the inconsistency and complexity that the statute 
224. See supra notes 106-14, 127, and accompanying text. 
225. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-472 (1994); see also supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text. 
226. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP SOUTHERN DISTRI= OF 
INDIANA I.A (1991) (more defense counsel); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM A= ADVI-
SORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DISTRI= COURT FOR THE DISTRI= OF MONTANA frontispiece 
(1991) (few resource-poor litigants) [hereinafter MONTANA REPORT]. See generally RAND PI-
LOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 18-19; Bettenhausen, supra note 108, at 300; Galanter, supra note 
138, at 97-119. 
227. This may seem too instrumental. I am merely saying that the groups were less expert 
and less concerned about maintaining national uniformity and simplicity than the Federal Advi-
sory Committee. A few groups suggested that their districts more strictly enforce local proce-
dures. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF CAL., CrvIL JusT1cE ExPENSE AND 
DELAY REDU=ION PLAN 3 (1991); U.S. DIST. & BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DIST. OF 
IDAHO, EXPENSE AND DELAY REDU=ION PLAN 1 (1991) [hereinafter IDAHO PLAN]. See gener-
ally RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 19-20, 24-26. 
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fostered.228 For instance, few circuit review committees critically ana-
lyzed, much less suggested alterations in, civil justice expense and de-
lay reduction plans, partly because chief district judges were 
apparently unwilling to analyze procedures prescribed by additional 
district judges in their appeals courts with whose districts they might 
have lacked farniliarity. 229 Some districts even failed to institute rec-
ommendations for modifications tendered by those circuit review 
committees that did perform rigorous oversight.230 Judicial Confer-
ence scrutiny was even less stringent for similar reasons that involved 
the reviewing entity's constitution and the unclear, weaker duties that 
Congress gave the Conference.231 
Congress discharged its monitoring responsibilities no more rig-
orously than circuit review committees or the Conference. Congress 
had the same obligation to oversee the CJRA as with any substantive 
legislation that it enacts. However, Congress may have assumed 
greater responsibility for monitoring the CJRA because, for instance, 
Congress instructed the Conference and the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts to furnish it material on the results of statu-
tory implementation.232 Nonetheless, Congress apparently undertook 
minimal review of the legislation's effectuation and never conducted 
oversight hearings. 
Several reasons may explain legislative reluctance to scrutinize 
CJRA implementation rigorously.233 Congress's stake in the per-
ceived success of the statute probably meant that it had a conflict of 
interest. Congress also might have deferred to the decisions of the 
districts in prescribing procedures or to the monitoring institutions 
that it established, while Congress could have wished to preserve cor-
dial ongoing relationships with the federal bench. Moreover, Con-
gress was preoccupied by many other important responsibilities. 
Insofar as Congress was tracking CJRA effectuation, the 1994 
congressional elections probably disrupted, and even halted, this ac-
tivity. The legal reform proposals-principally relating to securities 
litigation, product liability, and procedural changes-included in the 
Contract with America, which were essentially intended to restrict 
court access, had a quite different focus than the CJRA.234 These pro-
228. The instrumentalities are circuit review committees, the Judicial Conference, and Con-
gress. See 28 U.S.C. § 474. The Conference Committee on Case Management and Court Ad-
ministration had primary responsibility for Conference review. 
229. See Tobias, supra note 102, at 1407-08. 
230. For example, the Montana District did not adopt the Ninth Circuit Review Commit-
tee's suggestions on local procedures. See Minutes of Telephone Conference of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Civil Justice Reform Act Review Committee (Apr. 2, 1992) (on file with the author) 
[hereinafter Minutes]. See generally Tobias, supra note 102, at 1408. 
231. See Tobias, supra note 102, at 1409-11. 
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (pilot program). 
233. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 102, at 1411-13. 
234. See H.R. REP. No. 104-10 (1995); see also Cavanagh, supra note 116. See generally Carl 
Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1995). 
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posals' introduction and consideration substantially altered the terms 
of debate, although the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA)235 was the only constituent of the package that actually 
became law. Indeed, the reforms at least deflected attention from the 
CJRA and apparently had effects on that statute analogous to its im-
pacts on the JIA, essentially suspending interest in, if not implementa-
tion of, the CJRA. Finally, the 1994 congressional elections left 
Senator Biden, the CJRA's principal sponsor, as the ranking minority 
member, rather than chair, of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This 
meant that he could exercise less leadership to generate interest in 
overseeing statutory effectuation.236 
iii. Assessment Entities 
Congress designated several bodies to assess the procedures 
adopted under the CJRA and apparently intended that experimenta-
tion would receive rigorous analysis.237 However, the entities selected 
and difficulties involving statutory implementation may have compro-
mised this goal's achievement. For example, delayed adoption of 
CJRA measures in numerous pilot and demonstration districts com-
plicated the RAND and Federal Judicial Center (FJC) efforts to study 
those courts, while the FJC had relatively few resources for con-
ducting its evaluation.238 The districts and advisory groups to which 
Congress assigned responsibility for compiling annual assessments 
concomitantly had limited time, resources, and technical expertise for 
performing these analyses.239 
b. More Specific Analysis of the CJRA's Guidance and Its 
Effectuation 
i. The Structure of Experimentation 
Congress drafted the CJRA, and the districts implemented the 
statute, in ways that undermined uniformity and simplicity as well as 
enhanced judicial discretion, expense, and delay. A significant com-
plication was the choice to have each of the ninety-four districts effec-
tuate the Act, which meant that numerous districts were 
experimenting simultaneously. This situation precluded some courts 
235. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
236. Senator Biden is now the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, thus making Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) the ranking minority member of the Judiciary 
Committee. See Lawrence J. Goodrich, Senate Committees Choose Chiefs, CHRISTIAN Sc1. MON-
ITOR, Dec. 6, 1996, at 9. 
237. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text. 
238. See Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345; 
Act of Oct. 3, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-33, 109 Stat. 292 (amending the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990). See generally Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, The Civil Justice Reform Act Amend-
ment Act of 1995, 164 F.R.D. 577 (1996); Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, The Judicial 
Amendments Act of 1994, 159 F.R.D. 649 (1995). 
239. For more discussion of these entities, see infra notes 280-85 and accompanying text. 
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from capitalizing on previous efforts and reduced the opportunities 
for productive interchange among the districts.240 
The legislation concomitantly instructed each court to examine, 
and consider prescribing, eleven statutorily provided measures and 
any others found appropriate, rather than restricting, for instance, 
how many districts could experiment or the number of procedures 
that courts might employ.241 The statute encouraged numerous dis-
tricts to apply quite a few diverse mechanisms,242 certain ones of 
which increased complexity, phenomena that complicated and raised 
the cost of litigation by, for example, demanding that lawyers and liti-
gants prepare additional papers and participate in more activities.243 
ii. Congressional Guidance in the CJRA's First Three Sections 
Unclear guidance, conflicting prescriptions, and even internally 
inconsistent concepts in the legislation's initial three sections under-
mined uniformity and simplicity, while increasing cost and delay. Sec-
tion 471 provided the purposes of civil justice expense and delay 
reduction plans,244 section 472 instructed advisory groups how to for-
mulate reports and recommendations,245 and section 473 enumerated 
principles, guidelines, and techniques that districts were to examine 
and could have prescribed.246 
Particular aspects of section 472 show how the three provisions 
had internal inconsistencies and conflicted with each other. The sec-
tion commanded advisory groups to posit recommendations that 
would "reduc[ e] cost and delay and thereby facilitat[ e] access to the 
courts."247 Attempts to realize these two objectives might have con-
flicted, as the experience of litigants with few resources illustrates. 
Procedures that expedite case resolution can actually disadvantage, 
240. Congress required all districts to name advisory groups 90 days after passage. See 28 
U.S.C. § 478(a) (1994). Thirty-four courts qualified for EIDC status by adopting plans by the 
end of 1991, but most districts fully implemented plans in 1992, while numerous non-EIDCs 
attempted to finish their plans in 1992. Many groups and districts were essentially working at the 
same time, which limited opportunities to profit from prior experimentation and interdistrict 
consultation. 
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 473. 
242. For instance, the Eastern Districts of Arkansas and Virginia published brief plans that 
altered few local procedures. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE E. DIST. OF ARK., CIVIL JusncE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF VA., 
Civ1L JusTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991). The Eastern District of Texas 
assembled a terse plan that included several innovative ideas, while the Massachusetts District 
adopted a long plan with many complex procedures. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF 
TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991) [hereinafter E. DIST. OF 
TEXAS PLAN]; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION 
PLAN (1991). 
243. See Tobias, supra note 102, at 1422-27; see also infra note 259 and accompanying text. 
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 471. 
245. See id. § 472. 
246. See id. § 473. 
247. Id. § 472(c)(3); see also Tobias, supra note 156, at 495-98 (affording ideas regarding 
resource discrepancies among litigants in this paragraph and in remainder of article). 
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and limit federal court access for, impecunious parties who frequently 
need more time to conclude discovery and collect the requisite mate-
rial to prove their cases.248 Section 472, therefore, required advisory 
groups to make suggestions that would have implemented the require-
ment of delay reduction but frustrated the equally critical mandate of 
facilitating court access, which is in the provision's identical clause.249 
Essential to the issues examined in this article is the three sec-
tions' guidance, which encouraged the districts to adopt local meas-
ures that contravened the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and acts of 
Congress.250 Neither the language of the CJRA nor its legislative his-
tory apparently proscribed these inconsistencies. Section 473 pro-
vided that districts were to examine, and might prescribe, eleven 
enumerated mechanisms, while numerous courts seemingly depended 
on the statutory provisions to apply conflicting local requirements.251 
The CJRA's final prescription, which authorized courts to em-
ploy such additional measures as they considered appropriate after 
consulting recommendations of their advisory groups, implicitly in-
vited districts to adopt procedures that were inconsistent with the fed-
eral rules or statutes.252 Numerous advisory groups suggested that 
courts implement, and a number of districts prescribed, local proce-
dures that conflicted with provisions of the rules or the United States 
Code. The civil justice plan for the Eastern District of Texas most 
aggressively proffered this authority by declaring that "[t]o the extent 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this 
Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling. "253 The district, in 
an apparent effort to demonstrate that it could exercise this power, 
implemented an offer of judgment requirement that contravened Rule 
68.254 The court concomitantly instituted a maximum fee schedule in 
contingent fee cases that fee-shifting legislation does not govem,255 
although the Supreme Court has specifically proclaimed that litigation 
248. See Tobias, supra note 156, at 495-98. 
249. See supra text accompanying note 247. Section 472's delay reduction requirement 
could conflict with section 471 's statement that one purpose of plans is to "ensure just ... resolu-
tions of civil disputes." Compare 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3), with id. § 471. 
250. The Rules Enabling Act states that local rules must be "consistent with Acts of Con-
gress" and the federal rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a) (requiring local 
rules to "be consistent with-but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress" and federal rules). 
251. The most controversial illustrations implicated automatic disclosure, some of which 
would have substantially changed traditional notions of discovery. See, e.g., IDAHO PLAN, supra 
note 227, at pt. V; E. DIST. OF NEW YoRK PLAN, supra note 49, at pt. II.A. 
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6). Congress may have considered this a narrower grant of 
authority than did a number of judges. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy: Disunion-
ism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929 (1996); Robel, supra note 2; see also CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 63A, at 438-39 (5th ed. 1994). 
253. E. DIST. oF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 242, at art. VI(5). 
254. Compare id. at art. VI(a), with FED. R. Civ. P. 68. 
255. See E. DIST. OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 242, at art. V; see also Ashland Chem., Inc. v. 
Barco, Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265-67 (5th Cir. 1997); Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 885 
F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Carrington, supra note 252. 
588 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1998 
expenses are to be allocated by the legislative, rather than the judicial, 
branch.256 
iii. Practical Implementation 
(a) The Procedures Adopted 
Nearly all of the federal districts adopted varying combinations of 
the eleven legislatively prescribed principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques, while numerous courts applied a broad spectrum of mecha-
nisms pursuant to the last open-textured provision. A number of the 
measures that districts promulgated and enforced undermined uni-
formity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and imposed additional 
cost and delay. Indeed, the five-year RAND Corporation study of the 
pilot districts concluded that the CJRA procedures had saved little 
expense or time and had minimal effect on other important 
parameters.257 
Many courts applied particular strictures that had these impacts. 
For example, numerous districts' adoption of diverse permutations of 
automatic disclosure eroded uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstan-
tivity while increasing cost and delay.258 A number of courts invoked 
judicial case management mechanisms, which expanded judicial dis-
cretion to demand that attorneys or parties file more papers and par-
ticipate in additional conferences, thus imposing expense and delay.259 
CJRA provisions that empowered judicial officers to refer lawsuits to 
ADR in numerous districts similarly enlarged judicial discretion to re-
quire the involvement of counsel and litigants in activities that in-
creased cost and delay.260 Some courts employed multiple tracks for 
actions dependent on their case type or complexity, which enabled 
districts to apply diverse measures to different suits, thereby ex-
panding judicial discretion and reducing uniformity and 
transsubstantivity.261 
256. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990); see also 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). Additional courts prescribed measures which 
are or seem inconsistent, but most were less explicit. See, e.g., supra note 52 (noting Montana 
District's experimentation with coequal assignment of civil cases to Article III judges and magis-
trate judges). For elaboration of how the principles, guidelines, and techniques undermined uni-
formity and simplicity and for additional examples, see Tobias, supra note 102, at 1418-22. 
257. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 1-2; JuDICIAL CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997). 
258. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text; see also supra note 217 and accompany-
ing text. 
259. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l)-(3), (a)(5), (b)(l)-(3), (b)(5) (1994). See generally RAND 
JCM STUDY, supra note 119. 
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6), (b)(4). 
261. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE S. DIST. OF FLA., CIVIL JusTicE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 102-06 (1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL EARLY 
IMPLEMENTATION DIST., CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN pt. B.1 (1991); 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l)-(3). See generally RAND JCM STUDY, supra note 119, at 47-50. 
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In short, many mechanisms that districts adopted under the 
CJRA imposed expense and delay, a phenomenon that was exactly 
the opposite of the express statutory purpose. A number of additional 
measures were apparently neutral in the sense that they saved mini-
mal cost or time. Illustrative is the practice of setting early, firm trial 
dates under the second statutorily prescribed procedure in courts with 
substantial criminal dockets.262 Although early, firm settings may 
generally expedite litigation, they can be meaningless in this context 
because the Speedy Trial Act accords criminal cases an automatic 
preference leading to an "inefficient 'hurry up and wait' atmos-
phere. "263 Some efforts to employ differentiated case management 
similarly afforded little benefit because judges apparently prefer to re-
solve specific lawsuits in ways that they deem appropriate rather than 
fit them into predetermined classifications.264 Even the techniques 
that attained the CJRA's objective of decreasing expense or delay 
may have sacrificed uniformity, simplicity, or transsubstantivity or sig-
nificant process values, namely, justice or open court access, or had 
other adverse side effects.265 It is also important to remember that 
certain of the procedures that proved most efficacious were not actu-
ally new.266 
(b) Procedural Interpretation and Application 
Numerous judges inconsistently construed or applied a number of 
the local requirements instituted pursuant to civil justice reform, while 
a few judges failed to enforce some measures prescribed in the civil 
justice plans that their districts adopted.267 Many attorneys and par-
ties experienced problems locating the relevant local strictures,268 a 
phenomenon that automatic disclosure's implementation exemplifies. 
A few courts simply took no action respecting disclosure that they 
reduced to written form, thereby leaving treatment to local practice or 
understandings.269 Additional districts eschewed the procedure's in-
262. I rely in this sentence and the next on Cavanagh, supra note 116. 
263. Cavanagh, supra note 116. 
264. See id.; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text. See generally RAND JCM 
STUDY, supra note 119, at 47-50. 
265. For example, measures that facilitate dispute resolution or require participation in 
ADR can detrimentally affect impecunious parties who require greater time for discovery and 
for assembling their cases and who may lack resources to participate in ADR. 
266. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
267. These ideas are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with civil 
justice reform in many districts. Clear examples are the Southern District of Indiana and the 
District of Massachusetts. See also Carl Tobias, Recent Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 
55 MoNT. L. REv. 235, 239 (1994) (finding interdivisional disuniformity). 
268. I rely substantially here on my review of nationwide developments in civil justice re-
form, derived from evaluating advisory group reports and recommendations and districts' plans 
and from conversations with many individuals knowledgeable about civil justice reform. See also 
supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (discussing automatic disclosure). 
269. See Carl Tobias, Improving the I988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 1589, 1621 & n.207 (1994). 
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clusion in their civil justice plans and only published general, standing, 
or special orders, or sent letters to members of the local federal bar, 
little of which information was readily accessible, or conveyed, to at-
torneys who practice beyond the confines of the courts.270 
c. Evaluation of CJRA Implementation 
Congress seemingly contemplated that experimentation under 
the CJRA would receive comparatively rigorous analysis; however, 
complications involving statutory effectuation seemed to frustrate that 
objective's achievement. For instance, evaluators apparently encoun-
tered difficulty in comparing and contrasting various measures' effec-
tiveness across districts because too many courts were experimenting 
at the same time. A number of districts were unable to assemble the 
annual assessments specifically mandated by the CJRA.271 Some 
EIDCs concluded their analyses over a year after prescribing plans, a 
phenomenon that partly resulted from the failure to establish base-
lines for calculating expense and delay reduction.272 A few courts 
compiled brief evaluations that lacked empirical material and addi-
tional analytical information,273 while a number of districts did not 
issue these assessments annually.274 
The RAND Corporation, which the Judicial Conference selected 
to evaluate the pilot program, and the FJC, which the Conference 
chose to analyze the demonstration program, experienced difficulties 
concluding their studies.275 In fairness, some pilot districts and dem-
onstration courts delayed implementation of experimentation that 
correspondingly postponed RAND and FJC assessment efforts.276 
Congress responded to these circumstances by twice delaying the date 
on which the Conference was to tender its suggestions to Congress.277 
Notwithstanding the dearth of reliable empirical information, cer-
tain patterns can be identified. Numerous features of the CJRA and 
270. See, e.g., Order of John H. Moore II, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida (Nov. 9, 1993); Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court 
for the District of Montana, to Members of the Federal Bar of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Montana (Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). But see 
D. MoNT. R. 200-5(a). 
271. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). 
272. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23; Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil 
Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 124 (1993). 
273. See, e.g., Minutes of the Local Rules Committee (Feb. 1, 1993) (Wyoming) (on file with 
the author). 
274. Numerous courts may have issued no written annual assessments, and a few apparently 
published only one. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23; WESTLAW, CJRA 
Database; Cavanagh, supra note 116. 
275. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Carl Tobias, Extending the Civil Justice Reform 
Act of 1990, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 105 (1995). See also RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 
121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123. 
276. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
277. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 608, 110 Stat. 
3847, 3860; Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345. 
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statutory effectuation, especially the measures actually prescribed in, 
and applied under, the legislation, eroded the precepts of uniformity, 
simplicity, and transsubstantivity and enhanced expense and delay. 
The experimentation examined above essentially postponed those as-
pects of the JIA that Congress meant to treat the problems that re-
sulted from proliferating local procedures. 
2. Beneficial Aspects 
a. Relevant Entities 
i. Implementing Entities 
Some districts did bring together diverse participants in civil liti-
gation, who formulated creative cost and delay reduction measures 
that were responsive to all interests that are involved in federal law-
suits. These courts assembled advisory groups whose composition was 
balanced, for instance, in terms of plaintiffs and defense counsel.278 A 
number of groups made suggestions that were as solicitous of national 
uniformity and simplicity as of local judges, lawyers, and litigants, 
while a few groups developed innovative recommendations for de-
creasing expense or delay. For example, courts in a few states that 
encompass multiple districts insured intrastate uniformity by adopting 
identical CJRA procedures.279 
ii. Monitoring Entities 
Some monitoring entities rather rigorously discharged their over-
sight responsibilities. For example, the Ninth Circuit Review Commit-
tee closely evaluated, and recommended numerous modifications in, 
procedures, particularly inconsistent measures, prescribed by the 
EIDCs within the committee's purview.280 Moreover, a few districts 
responded to these suggestions by changing their requirements.281 
Statutory assignment of relatively unclear, limited duties to the Judi-
cial Conference and that entity's apparent deference to Congress 
probably explain less stringent Conference review.282 However, the 
Administrative Office and the FJC, the two primary research arms of 
the federal courts, carefully tracked CJRA implementation and pro-
278. See, e.g., MONTANA REPORT, supra note 226, at frontispiece; REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at frontispiece (1991), reprinted in 
138 F.R.D. 167 (1991). 
279. See, e.g., Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the N. & S. Districts of Iowa; Local 
Rules, U.S. District Courts for the E. & W. Districts of Kentucky; Local Rules, U.S. District 
Courts for the E., M., & W. Districts of Louisiana. 
280. See Minutes, supra note 230. But see supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
281. See, e.g., U.S. D1sT. CouRT FOR THE D1sT. OF ALASKA, CIVIL JusTICE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 7 (1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ., CIVIL JUSTICE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION (discovery motions) (1993). But see supra note 230 and ac-
companying text. 
282. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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duced several valuable studies of statutory effectuation.283 Compara-
tively lenient congressional oversight can probably be ascribed 
principally to the broad spectrum of other significant responsibilities 
that senators and representatives have and to the introduction and 
consideration of the legal reforms in the Contract with America. 
iii. Assessment Entities 
Congress did provide for some expert entities to evaluate experi-
mentation under the CJRA. For instance, the Judicial Conference se-
lected the RAND Corporation and the FJC to study the pilot and 
demonstration districts, and both instrumentalities produced compre-
hensive, refined reports.284 Even Congress's decision to assign dis-
tricts and advisory groups responsibility for conducting annual 
assessments relied upon entities that had substantial familiarity with 
the measures and the courts being evaluated.285 
b. More Specific Analysis of the CJRA's Guidance and Its 
Effectuation 
i. The Structure of Experimentation 
Congress did structure the statute in some ways that it intended 
to reduce or ameliorate inconsistency, complications, cost, and delay, 
or to promote important phenomena, such as bench-bar interchange 
and experimentation with innovative strictures. For instance, the 
CJRA prescribed eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques that 
Congress contemplated many courts would adopt while including a 
twelfth open-ended prescription that promoted experimentation with 
creative techniques.286 The statute provided for pilot districts and 
demonstration courts that applied analogous measures, thereby pro-
moting uniformity, and for EIDCs which were to experiment before 
the other districts, so that courts experimenting subsequently might 
benefit from the EIDCs' experience.287 The legislation initiated the 
most intensive self-evaluation by the district courts in their history. 
The conceptualization of reform proceeding from the bottom up fos-
tered valuable exchange within and among the ninety-four federal dis-
tricts and with the state courts. 
283. See, e.g., JumcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MoDEL PLAN FOR REDUCTION OF Ex. 
PENSE AND DELAY IN CIVIL CASES (1992); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, 
reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997). 
284. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123. 
285. For more discussion of these entities, see infra notes 304-20 and accompanying text. 
286. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1994). 
287. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. 
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ii. Practical Implementation 
(a) The Procedures Adopted 
593 
A number of the federal district courts prescribed comparatively 
similar combinations of the eleven statutorily delineated principles, 
guidelines, and techniques, while some courts even applied rather 
analogous mechanisms under the final open-ended proviso. Numer-
ous procedures that the districts promulgated and employed were rel-
atively uniform, simple, and transsubstantive, and certain measures 
saved expense or time. 
Many courts adopted or applied particular requirements that had 
these effects. At a general level, a number of districts that were not 
EIDCs apparently modeled their civil justice plans on those that the 
EIDCs had already issued while prescribing few strictures that the 
EIDCs had not employed. More specifically, the CJRA commanded 
the ten pilot courts to experiment with the six identical principles and 
guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction 
identified in section 473(a).288 
Numerous districts implemented some techniques, especially in 
the general fields of judicial case management, differentiated case 
management, discovery, and ADR, that directly treated expense and 
delay and seemed to be reasonably successful, even though the 
RAND study of pilot courts found minimal cost or delay reduction.289 
For example, RAND concluded that effective judicial case manage-
ment saved time and perhaps money, thus confirming the conven-
tional wisdom that has developed over two decades of reliance on 
these mechanisms.290 The District of Montana employed an opt-out 
procedure for securing consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction in civil 
cases that expedited dispute resolution.291 Several districts' use of dif-
ferentiated case management seemed to limit expense and delay 
somewhat.292 
The District of Maine and the Eastern District of New York re-
lied on judicial officers to treat discovery controversies promptly 
through telephone conference calls, thus saving the time and cost en-
tailed in preparing papers, participating in oral arguments, and resolv-
288. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
289. See RAND ExECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 22; RAND ADR STUDY, supra 
note 122, at 23-25. 
290. See RAND JCM STUDY, supra note 119, at 52-54; see also supra notes 30-38 and ac-
companying text. 
291. See 1994 ANN. ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE & DELAY REDUCTION 
PLAN OF THE U.S. DISTRICT CouRT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MoNT. 4; see also Carl Tobias, Re-
Evaluating Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 307, 312-13 (1995); To-
bias, supra note 52. 
292. See, e.g., 1995 DIFFERENTIATED CASE MGMT. IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
W. DISTRICT OF MICH., ANN. ASSESSMENT; 1993 U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THEN. DISTRICT OF 
OHIO, ANN. AssESSMENT OF Civ. & CRIM. DocKET, available in 1993 WL 319599, at 1-3 (herein-
after N. D1sT. OF OHIO AssESSMENT). See generally FJC STUDY, supra note 123, at 7-15, 29-132. 
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ing disputes.293 Some observers attribute the mounting number of 
settlements in civil suits in the District of Massachusetts to automatic 
disclosure,294 although experimentation with disclosure in the twenty 
courts that RAND studied and in some other districts has yielded in-
conclusive judgments regarding the technique's efficacy and whether 
it imposes expense or delay.295 
Certain ADR techniques seem to have enjoyed considerable suc-
cess. For instance, court-annexed arbitration has proved sufficiently 
effective that Congress authorized continued experimentation in nu-
merous districts while the first session of the 105th Congress empow-
ered all ninety-four courts to use court-annexed arbitration.296 The 
Early Assessment Program employed in the Western District of Mis-
souri has significantly increased the percentage of cases that settle in 
that court.297 
Many districts have applied a miscellany of procedures that have 
decreased expense or delay. For example, the District of Maryland 
has sharply limited disputes over attorney's fees by requiring that 
counsel who anticipate requesting fees submit monthly reports to the 
court.298 The Northern District of Illinois has employed status confer-
ences every six months in civil lawsuits to explore the pace of litiga-
tion, especially discovery, and this technique has expedited case 
resolution.299 The district has also encouraged its judges to volunteer 
in assisting other members of the court to treat litigation on their 
dockets, and awards the volunteers credit.300 The Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, which enjoys a reputation as a cohesive court, has relied 
293. See Telephone Interview with D. Brock Hornby, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maine (Jan. 29, 1997); Counsel Connect Debates; Civil Justice Reform; Five Years 
Later, TEX. LAW., Feb. 24, 1997, at 28 (discussing Eastern District of New York). See generally 
FJC STUDY, supra note 123, at 10-11. 
294. See Telephone Interview with Dan Coquillette, Professor, Boston College Law School 
(Jan. 27, 1997); see also D. MASS. R. 26.2. 
295. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 17; FJC STUDY supra note 123, at 
12; Cavanagh, supra note 116; supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 74; see also Act of Oct. 8, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 1, 111Stat.1173 
(authorizing all courts to use court-annexed arbitration). See generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER 
& DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT JN THE FEDERAL DISTRICf COURTS (Federal 
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1996). 
297. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kent Snapp & Deborah Bell to Judges in the Western 
District of Missouri (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with the author); see also FJC STUDY, supra note 
123, at 173-282 (describing the ADR and Multi-Option Programs in the Northern District of 
California and discussing the impact of the ADR programs); RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 
108, at 71-76; RAND ADR STUDY, supra note 122, at 23-25. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil 
Justice Reform in the Western District of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335 (1993). 
298. See Telephone Interview with Fred Russillo, CJRA Specialist, Administrative Office of 
U.S. Courts (Jan. 27, 1997); see also U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE DIST. OF Mo., REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES IN PRO BONO CASES (1997). 
299. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE N.D. OF ILL, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN (1993). 
300. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Fred Russillo, supra note 298. 
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upon similar measures that enable it to function as a court qua 
court.301 
In short, this survey of techniques that districts promulgated and 
applied under the CJRA suggests that numerous, diverse procedures 
have decreased expense and delay. The review also indicates that the 
courts have creatively developed and applied a number of efficacious 
mechanisms. In the final analysis, all ninety-four districts have main-
tained a measure of uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and 
most courts have not invoked procedures that imposed cost or delay. 
Experimentation thus shows that the statute was not a radical reform 
and that districts cautiously implemented the legislation. 
(b) Procedural Interpretation and Application 
The vast majority of district judges did, or attempted to, interpret 
and apply consistently local procedures adopted under the CJRA, 
while a very small number of judges refused to implement the require-
ments imposed in their courts' plans. Certain difficulties that accom-
panied the legislation's effectuation could have been ascribed more to 
judicial construction and implementation than to the statute as 
drafted. The quintessential illustration is the twelfth procedural provi-
sion that Congress apparently intended to be a considerably narrower 
grant of power than some federal judges treated it.302 
Numerous courts instituted certain measures to facilitate the 
CJRA's effectuation. The districts encouraged thorough, ongoing, and 
open bench-bar communication about the procedures considered, 
adopted, and applied, while a number of courts went to extraordinary 
lengths in notifying lawyers and litigants of the new techniques with 
which districts were experimenting. For example, some courts widely 
circulated proposed procedures and broadly disseminated information 
on the mechanisms actually implemented, and practically all districts 
reduced the measures to written form.303 
( c) Ancillary Benefits of Experimentation 
Experimentation in the ninety-four federal districts afforded 
many ancillary advantages. For instance, development of the advisory 
groups' reports and the civil justice plans, application of the cost and 
delay reduction procedures, and compilation of the annual assess-
ments of those measures and their refinement promoted valuable in-
301. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF PA., CIVIL JusncE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDucnoN PLAN (1991), available in 1991 WL 525098. 
302. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text. 
303. The Northern District of Illinois and the M<:mtana District widely circulated proposals 
and information on procedures actually applied. Indeed, two national services have reproduced 
most of the CJRA procedures in multivolume treatises, although one was first published in 1996. 
See DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL COURT GUIDELINES (1997); FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES (2d 
ed. 1995). 
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terchange involving judges, lawyers, litigants, and court personnel. 
Experimentation concomitantly encouraged the judges of numerous 
courts to view, or reconsider and emphasize, their districts as courts 
qua courts and to institute cooperative, districtwide mechanisms for 
limiting expense and delay. The national effort similarly fostered con-
structive exchange among judges, attorneys, parties, and court staff 
across many districts. 
c. Evaluation of CJRA Implementation 
Congress provided for the thoroughgoing assessment of the ex-
perimentation that proceeded in the districts. It commissioned an un-
precedented, searching analysis by the RAND Corporation of the 
pilot courts, while Congress asked that the Judicial Conference com-
prehensively evaluate the demonstration districts and submit to Con-
gress reports on the pilot and demonstration court experimentation 
and a recommendation on whether the pilot project warranted expan-
sion.304 Congress mandated that all ninety-four districts compile an-
nual assessments and refine the measures employed in light of those 
studies. 305 
RAND recently concluded its examination of the pilot courts, 
which is probably the most intensive analysis of federal districts' appli-
cation of techniques intended to reduce cost and delay ever under-
taken.306 RAND meticulously collected, evaluated, and synthesized 
an enormous amount of valuable empirical information on those pro-
cedures, the federal courts' operation, and participants in civil litiga-
tion. Some of these raw data will probably warrant greater scrutiny, 
which may well yield many instructive insights, because Congress and 
the Judicial Conference assigned RAND the relatively circumscribed 
charge of assessing comparatively few specific devices in a rather 
small number of districts.307 
The FJC also recently completed its analysis of the demonstration 
courts, which similarly affords helpful perspectives on the efficacy of 
the mechanisms that these districts applied and considerable addi-
tional material on the federal courts' functioning and those involved 
in civil litigation.308 The FJC effort is not as informative as the RAND 
endeavor principally because the Center had a narrower mandate, was 
studying five districts, had limited resources to perform its evaluation, 
and assembled, reviewed, and synthesized significantly less data.309 
304. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994); see also RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 
121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123; JumCIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 
175 F.R.D. 62, 73 (1997). The FJC actually performed the evaluation of the demonstration dis-
tricts. See FJC STUDY, supra. 
305. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). 
306. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121. 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 121 & 123. 
308. See FJC STUDY, supra note 123. 
309: See id. 
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However, the comprehensive, detailed nature of the report 'compiled, 
as well as the apparent success that several demonstration courts at-
tained in reducing expense or delay, means that the FJC endeavor 
should advance the inquiry in important ways.310 
The Judicial Conference submitted its report and recommenda-
tion on the pilot court experimentation to Congress in May 1997.311 
The Conference determined that the districts had applied most of the 
CJRA principles, guidelines, and techniques; however, the Confer-
ence did "not support expansion of the Act's case management princi-
ples and guidelines to other courts as a total package."312 The 
Conference based its recommendation primarily on the RAND analy-
sis which ascertained that considerations other than judicial case man-
agement measures drive litigation expenses and that the pilot court 
experimentation per se did not appear to decrease significantly cost or 
delay because the districts were already applying most of the statuto-
rily prescribed procedures.313 The Conference noted the RAND Cor-
poration's conclusion that six mechanisms proposed by the CJRA are 
efficacious, when used together, in reducing delay without increasing 
expense: "(1) early judicial case management; (2) early setting of the 
trial schedule; (3) shortening discovery cutoff; (4) periodic public re-
porting of the status of each judge's docket; (5) conducting scheduling 
and discovery conferences by telephone; and ( 6) implementing the ad-
visory group process. "314 The Judicial Conference report, therefore, 
provided suggested alternatives to expansion of the pilot program, 
which it premised essentially on statutory experimentation as well as 
findings, commentary, and suggestions relating to particular measures 
for effective case management.315 The alternative procedures and rec-
ommendations constituted the Conference's alternative expense and 
delay reduction program as required by the CJRA.316 
Numerous specific districts concluded their annual assessments in 
a timely manner, and some courts produced the evaluations during 
each year following the one in which they adopted CJRA plans.317 
Many districts conducted carefully structured, full or instructive analy-
ses, 318 while certain courts improved strictures that they applied in ac-
310. See supra notes 292, 297, and accompanying text. 
311. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997). 
312. Id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997). 
313. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 80 (1997). 
314. Id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997); see also id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 80-81 
(1997). 
315. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 74 (1997). 
316. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997). 
317. See WEsTLAW, CJRA Database; see also RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23-
59. The District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are illustrative. 
318. See, e.g., 1993 U.S. DISTRICT CouRT FOR THE N. DISTRICT OF GA., ANN. AssESSMENT 
OF THE CONDITION OF THE COURT'S DOCKET, available in 1993 WL 524466; N. D1sT. OF OHio 
AssESSMENT, supra note 292, available in 1993 WL 319599, at 1-3. 
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cord with information gleaned from the assessments.319 The Northern 
District of Ohio has even undertaken an ambitious effort to estimate 
costs and scrutinize effective ways of decreasing expenses,320 phenom-
ena which have proved much more elusive than those relating to delay 
and its reduction. 
3. Major Lessons 
The seven-year, unprecedented national experiment with proce-
dures that senators and representatives intended to limit cost and de-
lay in civil litigation affords a number of helpful lessons that involve 
Congress, the federal courts, districts, judges, court personnel, attor-
neys, and parties. The ideas have significant implications for them 
and should be especially useful to individuals and institutions, such as 
members of the Senate, the House, and the federal bench, as well as 
the Judicial Conference, that develop public policy for the district 
courts and that plan future reform efforts. 
a. The Modest Nature of the Reform 
The CJRA experience teaches that Congress instituted a rela-
tively modest reform that most federal districts cautiously imple-
mented and that yielded unremarkable results. These determinations 
are not surprising and might well have been anticipated, particularly 
given the statute's objectives, sources, and structure; the interests and 
perspectives of those assigned primary responsibility for effectuating 
the legislation and for monitoring that implementation; and proce-
dural reforms' intrinsic limitations, including the glacial pace at which 
they advance and the resistance of expense and delay to procedural 
amelioration. 321 
The findings of the RAND Corporation and the Judicial Confer-
ence that pilot court application of the six CJRA principles and guide-
lines provided little benefit in terms of important outcomes but that 
judicial case management can save time may seem inconclusive, while 
these determinations and the Conference's recommendation against 
expansion of the CJRA's case management principles and guidelines 
as a total package might be disappointing. Nonetheless, it is valuable 
to have systematically collected, analyzed, and synthesized empirical 
319. See, e.g., 1992 U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRI= OF N.J., ANN. ASSESSMENT OF 
THE Civ. JusT. EXPENSE & DELAY REou=ION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE Civ. JusT. 
REFORM Acr oF 1990 IN THE D1sTR1= OF N.J. 20; General Order No. 92-93 Amending Article 
Four, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas (Oct. 29, 1992). 
320. See Telephone Interview with Geri M. Smith, Clerk, U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio (Feb. 24, 1997). 
321. "[J]udicial reform is no sport for the short-winded." MrNIMUM STANDARDS OF Jum-
CIAL ADMrNISTRATION xix (Arthur Vanderbilt ed., 1949); see also Burbank, supra note 68, at 
1928. 
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data that apparently confirm the conventional wisdom regarding pro-
cedure's inherent restrictions and respecting case management. 
Congress had substantial responsibility for the modest character 
of civil justice reform. First, the CJRA's express purpose was decreas-
ing cost and delay in civil litigation through the application of proce-
dures. However, it was uncertain that expense or delay was 
sufficiently troubling to warrant treatment or that procedural change 
was the best solution, and even were these circumstances clearer, 
which measures would be most efficacious.322 A large percentage of 
the techniques that Congress prescribed and that courts applied had 
already received experimentation in numerous districts and many 
states, much of which testing suggested procedural reforms' intrinsic 
constraints.323 Those endeavors indicated, and the CJRA effort seem-
ingly reaffirms, that the federal and state courts have attained practi-
cally all of the cost and delay reduction possible with procedures. 
Indeed, nonprocedural approaches-such as supplementing the fed-
eral judiciary's resources, modifying court structure or administration, 
or altering the current American adversarial system-may more effec-
tively secure additional, meaningful monetary and temporal 
economies. 
Senators and representatives concomitantly ignored or underesti-
mated several phenomena that contribute to, or might decrease, ex-
pense and delay in civil litigation while minimally treating them in the 
CJRA. For example, some advisory groups, districts, and judges ob-
served that criminal cases are significant sources of cost and delay, a 
factor that the 1990 statute essentially disregarded,324 and others 
stated that the more expeditious filling of judicial vacancies could con-
serve resources and time.325 
Congress also entrusted most day-to-day CJRA effectuation and 
oversight to individuals and entities, while structuring and funding the 
CJRA in ways that may have limited the statute's efficacy, particularly 
its ambitious implementation. For instance, federal judges, many of 
whom believed that the legislation was an unwarranted, and even un-
constitutional, attempt to micromanage the courts, had virtually exclu-
sive responsibility for effectuating and monitoring the CJRA. 
322. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 80 
(1997). 
323. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 80 (1997). 
324. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADv1soRY GROUP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouRT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK pt. II (1991); ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. 
CouRT FOR THE MIDDLE D1s-r. OF N.C., supra note 131, at 57-58; RAND PILOT STUDY, supra 
note 108, at 21-22. But cf 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(l) (1994) (requiring analysis of criminal dockets). 
325. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UN-
TIED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA pt. IIJ(C)(2)(a) 
(1991); REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY 
GROUP FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS pt. II(B)(l-2) (1991); see also infra notes 409-17 and 
accompanying text (more phenomena). See generally Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a 
Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998). 
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Moreover, senators and representatives might have complicated effi-
cacious implementation and oversight by facilitating simultaneous ex-
perimentation in a large number of districts and by seeming to ignore 
or deemphasize integral features of the federal justice system. These 
include the individual calendaring scheme that the courts employ, the 
independence of Article III judges, and the deference that numerous 
members of the bench accord district judges when operating, and 
choosing procedures for, their courts. Congress correspondingly ap-
propriated rather few resources to effectuate the CJRA and to moni-
tor implementation.326 
It should not have been surprising that considerable statutory 
compliance was honored in the breach. For example, districts varied 
significantly in terms of the rigor with which they analyzed dockets, 
promulgated and applied CJRA measures, evaluated those mecha-
nisms' effectiveness, and prepared annual assessments, while most cir-
cuit review committees undertook minimal oversight of the strictures 
that district courts prescribed and enforced.327 
Finally, even if procedures were more efficacious in reducing ex-
pense or delay and all districts and judges were to adopt identical re-
quirements, a major impediment would remain. Certain phenomena, 
such as the federal courts' structure, disparate local conditions, the 
perceived need to address dissimilar cases differently, and individual 
judges' abilities, predilections, and viewpoints, would seriously frus-
trate uniform procedural administration and application. 
b. Ironies 
CJRA experimentation was replete with ironies, some of which 
already have been mentioned. One illustration is how the experience 
apparently sensitized many participants in federal civil litigation to 
several developments. Perhaps most importantly, the increased bal-
kanization of procedure that testing wrought has seemingly galvanized 
much of the bar and numerous judges to explore and institute means 
of decreasing fragmentation, particularly by limiting the proliferation 
of inconsistent local measures.328 For instance, a number of districts 
have comprehensively evaluated local requirements in an attempt to 
make them simpler and more uniform or have actually abrogated or 
modified strictures, principally conflicting ones.329 Indeed, CJRA ex-
perimentation that suspended effectuation of the JIA mandates that 
326. See Cavanagh, supra note 116. 
327. See supra notes 227, 267-74, and accompanying text (analyzing districts); supra notes 
228-29 and accompanying text (analyzing circuit committees); see also supra notes 41-43, 53-54, 
83-87, 132-41, and accompanying text (suggesting compliance resembles most circuit councils' 
and districts' discharge of duties to limit local proliferation imposed in JIA and Rule 83). 
328. I rely in this sentence and the remainder of this paragraph on Cavanagh, supra note 
116; see also supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text; infra note 405 and accompanying text. 
329. See supra notes 132, 134-35, 318-19, and accompanying text. 
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Congress intended to reduce local procedural proliferation has rekin-
dled interest in treating the very problem that the JIA was meant to 
address. The balkanization created concomitantly imposed additional 
expense and delay, a result precisely the opposite of the legislation's 
expressly stated goal. 
A few ironies involved the CJRA mechanisms that proved to be 
most efficacious. For example, RAND and the FJC, as well as many 
judges, attorneys, and litigants, found that the statutorily prescribed 
procedures employed in pilot and demonstration districts were com-
paratively ineffective, even though Congress and the courts spent mil-
lions of dollars testing and assessing those measures.330 More specific 
illustrations are various forms of ADR which were costly and auto-
matic disclosure that apparently operated best in narrow, discrete con-
texts.331 In contrast, judicial case management, which judges have 
practiced for two decades, saved time and perhaps expense, while cer-
tain other techniques that districts had used earlier worked well.332 
Some quite successful procedures also were ones that courts and 
judges invented, a phenomenon that could attest to congressional wis-
dom in encouraging experimentation from the bottom up and capital-
izing on local ingenuity.333 
Perhaps the consummate irony was the apparent inability of Con-
gress to sustain interest in the reform until its completion. Indeed, the 
first session of the 105th Congress recessed in November 1997 without 
definitively resolving the fate of the CJRA, which was ostensibly 
scheduled to expire on December 1, 1997.334 Congressional failure to 
provide conclusively for statutory expiration leaves unclear whether 
the CJRA actually expired last December partly because the relevant 
legislative history is sparse and ambiguous.335 This lack of clarity 
means that many districts have continued to apply procedures that 
they prescribed under the CJRA, although such measures that conflict 
330. See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra notes 213-17, 258, 260, and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 289-90, 296, and accompanying text; see also supra notes 115-17 and 
accompanying text. 
333. See supra notes 291, 293, 297-301, and accompanying text. 
334. The statute provides that the "requirements set forth in sections 471 through 478 of title 
28, United States Code [(the CJRA)] ... shall remain in effect for seven years after" the Decem-
ber 1, 1990, date of enactment. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, § 103(b)(2), 104 Stat. 5096. But see Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 
1173. 
335. Subsection (b)(2) subjects sections 471 through 478 of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
to a seven-year sunset provision so that those sections can be thoroughly tested. Upon the 
expiration of the seven-year period following enactment, federal district courts are no 
longer required to operate pursuant to the civil justice expense and delay reduction plans 
mandated by Title I. Congress and the courts then will have a chance to evaluate those 
provisions and, if warranted, reauthorize them. 
S. REP. No. 101-416, at 63-64 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852-53. 
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with the federal rules or United States Code provisions would be inva-
lid if the statute did expire.336 
c. Local Legal Culture and Civil Justice Reform 
The idea of local legal culture yields instructive insights on CJRA 
experimentation, even as the seven-year experience enhances under-
standing of the local legal culture concept. This notion means that 
norms relating to phenomena, such as judges' productivity, discovery's 
pace, and lawyers' civility, can differ significantly across districts, may 
be responsible for the varied expense and time that are needed to 
resolve civil disputes and could respond to distinctive local 
procedures. 337 
Several aspects of CJRA testing suggest that the analytical con-
struct of local legal culture, which researchers had employed primarily 
in the criminal law context, applies more felicitously than was for-
merly thought to civil litigation.338 For instance, the experience with 
judicial case management generally shows that the disparate condi-
tions in particular courts affect cost and delay in civil lawsuits, that 
these disputes are responsive to diverse case management, and that 
nationwide deployment of identical measures can be impractical. 
CJRA experimentation more specifically revealed numerous, 
rather informative geographical patterns. Illustrative are certain dis-
tricts situated in urban areas that encouraged their courts' judges to 
cooperate and the districts to function as courts qua courts when expe-
diting the disposition of substantial caseloads.339 Other metropolitan 
districts were among the initial courts that treated the proliferation of 
conflicting local strictures or aggressively resisted abusive behavior of 
attorneys and parties during lawsuits.340 By comparison, a number of 
districts that are in sparsely populated locales have exhibited less con-
cern about, and adopted fewer mechanisms to address, delay, litiga-
tion and discovery abuse, and incivility.341 It also seems that some 
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994); FED. R. Crv. P. 83. One minor exception to the ideas 
regarding inconsistent measures prescribed under the CJRA is the provision in certain 1993 
federal civil rules amendments, principally governing discovery, that authorizes the courts to 
promulgate and implement procedures that vary from the federal rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(l). 
337. See Robel, supra note 2, at 1483-84; see also RAND JCM STUDY, supra note 119, at 36-
37; Carrington, supra note 252, at 945-47. See generally THOMAS W. CHURCH ET AL., JusTICE 
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LmGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978). 
338. Some researchers have persuasively questioned the concept's applicability to civil liti-
gation. See Herbert Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of 
Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'y REv. 535 (1993). 
339. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text. 
340. The Eastern and Southern Districts of New York treated proliferation by adopting 
identical local civil rules. The Southern and the Northern Districts of California and Illinois 
accounted for one-third of the early Rule 11 decisions under the 1983 revision of Rule 11, and I 
assume that aggressive resistance to abusive behavior has continued in those courts. See 
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1987). 
341. Illustrative are the Districts of North and South Dakota. 
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courts, whose Article III judges and magistrate judges are viewed sim-
ilarly by attorneys and parties for purposes of civil dispute resolution, 
serve cultures that enjoy reputations for egalitarianism.342 In short, 
these examples suggest that the local legal culture idea applies more 
usefully to civil litigation than was earlier believed, that districts' vary-
ing norms can contribute to differences in the cost and time required 
for concluding civil cases, and that disparate local circumstances re-
spond to diverse measures. 
d. The Unclear Nature of Procedural Reform: Reconciling 
the CJRA and the JIA 
The analysis above indicates that the JIA and the CJRA, as 
drafted and as effectuated, cannot be comprehensively harmonized 
and may well conflict in several critical ways. When Congress passed 
the JIA, it correctly understood that proliferating local requirements 
were substantially undermining federal civil procedure's uniform, sim-
ple, and transsubstantive nature, enlarging judicial discretion, and im-
posing expense and delay in civil litigation. Congress provided for 
entities and accorded them responsibilities that would address 
proliferation's complications, namely, the increasing inconsistency be-
tween local strictures and the federal rules and statutes, while it sys-
tematized and opened to public scrutiny and involvement local 
procedural revision processes.343 
Senators and representatives seemed to perceive that restoring 
and maintaining the primacy of the national rule amendment process 
might correspondingly treat proliferation and slow erosion of the fun-
damental procedural precepts. Statutory prescription for opening fed-
eral rule revision to greater public participation and input was meant 
to enhance the quality of amendments proposed, even though that 
legislative provision probably exposed this process to increased 
politicization.344 Congress, accordingly, reconfirmed and attempted to 
revitalize several basic procedural concepts, namely, uniformity and 
simplicity, that underlay the 1938 federal rules, and comprehensive 
implementation of the JIA might have achieved these purposes. Ef-
fectuation of the CJRA, however, essentially supplanted the JIA's as-
pects that were intended to limit local procedural proliferation, while 
certain 1993 federal rule revisions accommodated the 1990 legislation. 
When Congress passed the CJRA, it emphasized different fea-
tures of civil justice. Senators and representatives identified cost and 
delay as important problems in considerable civil litigation and appar-
ently believed that the uniform, simple, transsubstantive system of the 
342. Illustrative are the Districts of Montana and Oregon. See supra note 291 and accompa-
nying text. 
343. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 74-79, 154-71, 184-201, and accompanying text. 
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federal rules was substantially responsible for these complications.345 
Congress's changed conceptualization of the foremost difficulties con-
fronting modern dispute resolution prompted its employment of new 
techniques to combat them. In contrast with the JIA's purpose of re-
ducing local proliferation, the CJRA facilitated district court experi-
mentation involving potentially inconsistent local procedures that 
were meant to address expense and delay.346 Congress also pre-
scribed institutions and assigned them responsibilities that it intended 
would promote healthy dialogue among judges, attorneys, and parties, 
across the districts, and between the federal and state courts, thereby 
fostering reform from the bottom up, and discovery of, and consensus 
about, cost and delay reduction measures. The CJRA, thus, stressed 
the procedural precepts implicating prompt, economical dispute dis-
position, as opposed to uniformity, simplicity, transsubstantivity, and 
significant process values. The practice of managerial judging and the 
1983 federal rules changes best exemplify the themes that Congress 
emphasized in 1990. 
Several dimensions of CJRA effectuation suggest that senators 
and representatives did not fully conceptualize the legislation's goals 
and its practical implementation, particularly vis-a-vis the 1988 Act. 
Most compelling was the 1990 statute's implicit invitation for courts to 
prescribe local measures that contravened the federal rules or acts of 
Congress.347 That provision probably encouraged numerous districts 
to adopt conflicting requirements and dissuaded circuit judicial coun-
cils from scrutinizing, much less abolishing, inconsistent local stric-
tures. The above phenomena, especially the further erosion of a 
national, uniform code of procedure, witnessed so soon after the JIA's 
enactment, were ironic because the proliferation of conflicting local 
requirements was a crucial problem that this legislation specifically 
attempted to rectify. These particular statutory tensions are not iso-
lated but could epitomize broader inconsistencies. For instance, the 
JIA's purpose of reviving and increasing uniformity, simplicity, and 
transsubstantivity clashed with the 1990 Act's objective of implement-
ing local measures that would decrease cost and delay, factors that 
could be attributed to the uniform, simple, transsubstantive system 
that the original federal rules instituted.348 
The CJRA's goals, structure, and timing, and the 1993 federal 
rules revisions authorizing local option, alone and together, essentially 
frustrated attainment of the JIA's purposes and suspended attempts 
to address local proliferation, which had eroded uniformity, simplicity, 
345. See supra notes 90-94, 105, and accompanying text. 
346. See supra notes 107, 112, 252-56, and accompanying text. 
347. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (1994); see also supra note 346 and accompanying text. 
348. Judges also must have the requisite flexibility to apply local strictures that permit the 
expeditious, economical, and just resolution of cases on local dockets. See Robert E. Keeton, 
The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853 (1989). 
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and transsubstantivity and increased judicial discretion, cost, and de-
lay. The state of federal civil procedure, therefore, is worse than the 
condition that Congress considered unacceptable in 1988. The 
problems entailed in implementing the 1990 statute and the 1993 fed-
eral rule amendments examined already have exacerbated the proce-
dural circumstances. In fact, the precepts of uniformity, simplicity, 
and transsubstantivity that supported the 1938 federal rules are more 
significantly eroded, while judicial discretion, expense, and delay 
could be larger than at any time since the rules' adoption. Judges, 
lawyers, and parties simply confront too many requirements, substan-
tial numbers of which are overly complex, very different, and even 
inconsistent, or are quite difficult to find, comprehend, and satisfy. 
These developments have undermined the primacy of federal proce-
dures over local ones, effectively eviscerating the national civil proce-
dure code and enormously complicating federal practice, particularly 
for entities that litigate in multiple districts, such as the Department of 
Justice, public interest organizations like the Sierra Club, and large 
corporations. 
Some problems can probably be ascribed less to Congress and to 
the CJRA as drafted than to additional institutions or the Act's effec-
tuation. For example, the JIA and the CJRA were well-intentioned 
attempts to address significant difficulties that involve civil procedure 
at the twentieth century's close. However, congressional enactment, 
especially of the 1990 legislation, perpetuated, and perhaps com-
pounded, perennial tensions between the legislative and judicial 
branches that might be unavoidable in the critical field of court 
rulemaking, implicating, as it must, complex questions of separation of 
powers and shared duties.349 
Senators and representatives could have viewed the CJRA's 
twelfth, open-ended provision as a narrower authorization to pre-
scribe conflicting local requirements than a number of judges consid-
ered it.350 The Advisory Committee concomitantly was more 
responsible than Congress for the confusion that arose when the 1993 
federal rules revisions became effective on the identical date that nu-
merous districts adopted civil justice plans.351 
Congress may have incompletely understood the objectives, oper-
ation, and implementation of the CJRA, particularly its integration 
with the JIA. Senators and representatives seemingly failed to appre-
hend that certain central aspects of the two statutes were inconsistent 
349. These ideas may epitomize larger issues involving interbranch relations evinced in an-
nual reports on the judiciary. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, 
1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm> 
[hereinafter Year-End Report]; see also Mullenix, supra note 2, at 379-82, 399-400; William H. 
Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1. 
350. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
351. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text. 
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or even that the measures fostered dissimilar, and often diametrically 
opposed, procedural precepts. Insofar as Congress foresaw that the 
CJRA could clash with, and suspend, the JIA or prevent realization of 
the earlier legislation's core purposes, Congress might have meant to 
limit those impacts or have deemed the discontinuation a temporary 
inconvenience that was outweighed by the greater need to experiment 
with local expense and delay reduction mechanisms.352 
In sum, Congress identified cost and delay as important complica-
tions in late twentieth-century disputing and provided for entities and 
measures that would respond to these problems in the CJRA. Sena-
tors and representatives may have not considered comprehensively 
the legislation's goals, structure, and implementation, especially in 
light of the JIA. The resolution of this and several related difficulties 
that I surveyed above could require institutions, strictures, procedural 
amendment processes, and methods of experimentation that differ 
from the ones that Congress provided or contemplated in the 1988 
and 1990 statutes. Attempts to capitalize on the measures and on 
their effectuation by emphasizing, building on, and meshing the legis-
lation's finest features and eschewing or limiting the Acts' least desira-
ble dimensions would be more profitable than efforts to harmonize 
the statutes. This is particularly true given the possibility of the 
CJRA's expiration and the concomitant prospect of reviving and fully 
implementing the JIA, which afford the most felicitous solution by 
maximizing both enactments' benefits. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introduction 
At a rather general level, the objectives of revitalizing and in-
creasing uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and of decreas-
ing expense and delay should continue to animate reform efforts. 
These fundamental procedural precepts, even as diluted, have served 
the federal courts, Congress, judges, attorneys, parties, and the public 
remarkably well for six decades and have respected crucial process 
values, such as broad court access and justice. The propositions, as 
general principles, also envision that restoration and enhancement of 
uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and reduction of cost 
and delay are not absolutes, especially when the precepts clash. For 
example, the successful practice of judicial case management in many 
districts since the 1970s and reliance on specific, different devices to 
352. The PSLRA may, and the procedural and the products liability reform proposals could, 
have had analogous, albeit narrower, effects on the CJRA. See supra notes 234-36 and accompa-
nying text. The PSLRA passed, and Congress seriously analyzed the other two measures, before 
RAND even completed the unprecedented study that Congress commissioned. See supra notes 
234-36 and accompanying text. The PSLRA's revision of nine federal rules in securities litiga-
tion also complicates realization of the JIA's goals of restoring the national revision process's 
primacy and a national procedure code. 
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resolve complex suits show that expense and delay imperatives can 
override uniformity and transsubstantivity in some circumstances.353 
Attempts to maximize realization of the salutary dimensions of 
the two acts prompt more particularized recommendations. Capitaliz-
ing on the legislation's best aspects requires that the primacy of the 
national rule amendment process be restored. The local procedural 
status quo that obtained in 1988 should be secured, while the JIA's 
prescriptions pertaining to local strictures, especially the proliferation 
of inconsistent requirements, must be comprehensively implemented. 
The measures receiving CJRA experimentation that saved money or 
time and that honor significant procedural concepts should be in-
cluded in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The mechanisms that 
appeared promising, but were insufficiently efficacious to deserve na-
tional application, might be identified for future experimentation. 
The 1990 statute should sunset, and the entities and procedural 
amendment processes that it instituted ought to merge into the ones 
that existed or were prescribed in 1988. Congress should clearly state 
that CJRA procedures that were less effective must expire, and dis-
tricts and judges need to abrogate them. A revision in Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 83, which resembles the 1991 proposed amendment 
that the Advisory Committee withdrew in apparent deference to 
CJRA testing, should replace the techniques for experimenting pre-
scribed by the 1990 statute.354 
In short, the analysis above suggests that the preferable approach 
is to capitalize on the finest constituents of the JIA and the CJRA. 
The remainder of this section affords suggestions for the future, pri-
marily respecting entities, procedures, processes, and experimenta-
tion.355 Congress enacted the 1988 and 1990 legislation and has the 
ultimate power to fashion procedural policy; however, the following 
recommendations are aimed at all applicable decision makers and par-
ticipants in federal civil litigation. These encompass Congress, na-
tional and local procedural revision bodies, federal districts and 
judges, court personnel, lawyers, and litigants. Existing institutions 
can effectuate most of the proposals absent statutory prescription.356 
This section examines the JIA as well as the CJRA because I suggest 
353. See supra notes 30-38, 289-90, 292, and accompanying text. 
354. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 429-35 and accom-
panying text. 
355. These parameters are not completely separable. For example, institutions implement 
revision processes and adopt procedures through experimentation. The suggestions provide a 
conceptual framework for analysis with specific examples but leave technical details to others. 
356. Congress can institute most of the ideas that I offer, but it might consider creating a 
national civil procedure commission that could implement many recommendations and would 
have sufficient independence and resources to develop promising ways of improving civil proce-
dure in the next century. Such a commission must have a staff with no additional duties. A 
helpful model is the National Commission on Judicial Discipline. See Colloquy, Disciplining the 
Federal Judiciary, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1-430 (1993). 
608 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1998 
the 1990 Act's expiration, retention of its premier features, and the 
1988 measure's revival and thorough implementation. 
B. A Preliminary Word About Empirical Data 
The maximum relevant empirical information that can be system-
atically collected, evaluated, and synthesized should inform decision 
making on the future of the CJRA, the JIA, and the civil justice sys-
tem. The RAND Corporation and the FJC assembled, assessed, and 
synthesized much applicable material in compiling their studies, 
although both entities apparently gathered considerable raw data that 
they have not scrutinized and that could be instructive. Moreover, 
RAND and the Center had relatively narrow assignments to analyze 
experimentation with comparatively few procedures in some courts.357 
The remaining seventy-nine districts may also have an enormous mass 
of unexamined or undigested material, while the Administrative Of-
fice and the FJC have access to similar information. Judges, advisory 
groups, lawyers, litigants, and court personnel in all ninety-four dis-
tricts also might have derived perceptive insights from experimenta-
tion that could improve future procedural policy making. 
Illustrative of certain ideas in the paragraph above may be the 
Montana District, the court with which I am most familiar. 358 My at-
tempt to track CJRA implementation since its inception and my ser-
vice as an advisory group member since 1994, as well as discussions 
with numerous participants in the court's litigation, have led me to 
formulate several conclusions that might apply to other districts. For 
example, the ability and speed with which the court's magistrate 
judges treat cases may have led numerous attorneys and parties to 
consider them and Article III judges as similar for purposes of civil 
dispute resolution. Automatic disclosure has seemed to work well, 
partly because many lawyers and clients have apparently accommo-
dated, rather than strictly complied with, disclosure strictures and be-
cause the court reinforces disclosure with a local sanctioning provision 
that incorporates, but actually contravenes, Federal Rule 11.359 
The perception that requirements for preparing papers and par-
ticipating in activities make time to disposition longer and litigation 
more costly in the federal district has also enhanced state courts' ap-
peal, even as attorneys' experiences with state court mechanisms, such 
as mandatory settlement conferences, have seemingly increased their 
receptivity to the federal district's application of analogous proce-
dures. Some evidence concomitantly suggests that CJRA experimen-
357. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
358. I rely here on a series of articles that analyze the Montana District. See Carl Tobias, 
Ongoing Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 57 MoNT. L. REv. 511, 511 n.1 (1996). 
359. See D. MoNT. R. 200-5(a)(4); see also FED. R. CIV. P. ll(d); Sheetz v. Bridgestone/ 
Firestone, 152 F.R.D. 628 (D. Mont. 1993). 
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tation has reduced the federal bar's size. The examination of other 
courts has afforded, or can offer, similar ideas that could be profitably 
compared and contrasted.360 
In short, Congress, in resolving the fate of the CJRA and Con-
gress and the Judicial Conference when considering future reforms, 
should consult the maximum relevant data. Procedural policy makers 
must concomitantly eschew reliance on anecdotal information, which 
advocates apparently invoked to support legal reform proposals in the 
Contract with America and certain aspects of the 1990 statute.361 All 
of the material that involves CJRA experimentation has yet to be 
gathered, evaluated, and synthesized; however, there is ample applica-
ble information on which to premise the recommendations below. 
C. Institutions 
1. National Rule Revision Entities 
The national rule amendment institutions must recapture and re-
tain major responsibility for changing those strictures that cover fed-
eral civil litigation. The revisors have served Congress, the courts, 
judges, attorneys, litigants, and the public very well since the 1930s, 
and the entities possess enormous experience and knowledge relating 
to federal civil procedure. The institutions can most felicitously revi-
talize, maintain, and increase the essential procedural precepts, espe-
cially uniformity and simplicity, even as they implement exceptions, 
when warranted. The entities' broad perspectives facilitate their de-
velopment of proposals for improvement that take into account what 
is preferable for the entire civil justice process. For example, the Judi-
cial Conference has the systemic, expert viewpoint to designate the 
measures that deserve adoption by all ninety-four districts or that are 
sufficiently efficacious to support departure from the federal rules for 
purposes of experimentation or of addressing unusual problems in 
specific courts.362 Congress has trained a national perspective on the 
oversight and change of federal rule revisions; however, it has rarely 
scrutinized local procedural modifications.363 Local rules committees 
that assist the judges in analyzing and altering district court require-
ments correspondingly can be more solicitous of local concerns than 
of national uniformity or simplicity. 
360. See, e.g., Mary B. McManamon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a Cure-All 
or a Placebo? An Examination of the Plans of Two Pilot Districts, 11 REV. LITIG. 329 (1992); 
Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of Texas: Creating and 
Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REv. 
LITIG. 165 (1992); see also FJC STUDY, supra note 123; Cavanagh, supra note 116. 
361. See supra notes 88-105, 234-36, and accompanying text; see also supra note 352. 
362. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
363. See supra notes 58-60, 73, 167, 199-201, and accompanying text. Even when Congress 
evinced concern about local proliferation in the JIA, Congress itself did not scrutinize local 
procedures but assigned this task to circuit judicial councils, districts, and individual judges. 
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The Advisory Committee, as among those institutions-the Com-
mittee, the Standing Committee, the Conference, the Supreme Court, 
and Congress-that are involved in national rule amendment, must 
remain primarily responsible for studying the federal rules and draft-
ing suggested changes. Every entity above the Advisory Committee 
in this hierarchy should continue participating but show increasing 
deference to the institution below it. The Court and Congress ought 
to remain involved in national rule revision, principally as gatekeepers 
that reject, modify, or remand proposed alterations that they find 
inadvisable. 
My recommendations honor long-standing tradition, such as the 
Advisory Committee's recognition and cultivation of uniformity, sim-
plicity, and transsubstantivity. The ideas also reflect the respective in-
terest, expertise, and appreciation for the pragmatic consequences of 
procedural change that the entities apparently bring, and the time, en-
ergy, and money that they can commit, to rule amendment. The sug-
gestions address a number of problematic, and often inconsistent, 
factors. These include the need for Supreme Court and congressional 
participation to legitimate rule revision, for multiple institutions with 
varying perspectives, experience, and resources to review and improve 
proposals, and for comparatively prompt amendment which too many 
bodies' involvement confounds. The Court's very deferential scrutiny 
of the 1993 federal revisions as well as the Justices' disparate views 
regarding that approach's propriety and the advisability of the Rule 11 
and 26 amendments support the circumscribed participation that I rec-
ommend for the Court.364 Congress's vacillation in considering the 
1993 changes concomitantly justifies the limited role suggested for 
it.365 
2. Local Procedural Revision Entities 
As among those entities that participate in local procedural revi-
sion, the local rules committees that the JIA and Federal Rule 83 re-
quire should subsume the advisory groups, which the 1990 Act 
prescribed.366 Too many institutions with similar responsibilities are 
involved in the local modification process. The advisory groups have 
attained their chief objectives of fostering and evaluating broad exper-
imentation and of promoting valuable interchange among judges, law-
yers, and parties, and the bodies, namely, local rules committees, that 
they effectively displaced can ably discharge any duties that remain. 
The few courts that have yet to name local rules committees must ex-
peditiously appoint them, and these entities should be balanced, in 
364. See supra notes 163-65, 197-98, and accompanying text. 
365. See supra notes 167, 199-210, and accompanying text; see also infra paragraph following 
text accompanying note 431 (suggesting why Congress should exercise caution when statutorily 
adopting procedures). 
366. See supra notes 41-43, 83-84, 108-09, 130-32, 140-41, and accompanying text. 
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terms of plaintiff and defense interests, political views, race, and gen-
der, and have the maximum expertise, perhaps including some CJRA 
advisory group members whose prior service will be helpful.367 Spe-
cific judges who envision actively adopting new, or amending current, 
individual judge procedures should probably appoint their own local 
rules committees. Each local entity can advise districts and judges in 
developing suggestions for procedural alterations, help secure consen-
sus on the finest strictures, and promote valuable bench-bar 
interchange. 
As among those institutions that are involved in local procedural 
revision, all of the judges of the ninety-four districts, working with 
local rules committees, must assume major responsibility for formulat-
ing proposed modifications, while particular judges should defer to 
these entities when contemplating individual judge measures. All of 
the judges, in consultation with the committees, ought to have the ex-
pertise, appreciation of local conditions, and concern for national uni-
formity and simplicity that are necessary to draft and promulgate local 
requirements that revive and foster those precepts and that decrease 
expense and delay. 
3. Monitoring Entities 
The courts, the district judges, the local rules committees, and the 
circuit judicial councils, which the CJRA essentially rendered mori-
bund for the purpose of reducing local proliferation, must reassume, 
and comprehensively implement, their obligations to review local pro-
cedures.368 Of course, the districts, judges, and committees could 
thoroughly effectuate the duties by scrutinizing for consistency all lo-
cal strictures, including mechanisms prescribed under the 1990 statute, 
and abrogating or modifying measures deemed to conflict.369 This ap-
proach would enable them to limit, if not obviate, the need for exter-
nal oversight. 
Exogenous institutions should assume some responsibility for 
monitoring local procedures in courts whose judges or local rules com-
mittees undertake insufficiently rigorous review. For example, circuit 
judicial councils, which are to examine periodically the districts' local 
requirements and abolish or alter those found inconsistent, must dis-
charge these obligations. Few councils have performed the duties 
principally because the CJRA's implementation effectively suspended 
367. See supra notes 83, 108-09, 130, 226, and accompanying text. Advisory group members 
can improve understanding of the CJRA's history, promote bench-bar exchange, and help har-
monize civil justice reform with future procedural efforts. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 
108, at 13-26; see also JumCIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 
62, 67, 82-83 (1997) (recommending continuation of advisory group process). 
368. Circuit judicial councils which can best perform oversight should subsume circuit re-
view committees that the CJRA created. See supra notes 86-87, 124, and accompanying text. 
369. If Congress allows the CJRA to sunset, districts and judges should abrogate inconsis-
tent CJRA procedures, even though they may wish to retain those that proved efficacious. 
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oversight or because Congress failed to authorize funds for monitor-
ing. The entities might consult the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's 
review of fifteen districts' local strictures, as that endeavor shows how 
to satisfy this responsibility with limited resources, while Congress 
could facilitate oversight by allocating the requisite appropriations.370 
If numerous councils remain reluctant to monitor local proce-
dures, even after the CJRA expires and simplifies review by signifi-
cantly decreasing the number of local requirements that need 
evaluation, the Judicial Conference or Congress should apply other 
approaches. For instance, a Conference committee, the FJC, or Ad-
ministrative Office staff might assist specific councils in conducting 
oversight. The Conference or Congress could even create a central-
ized entity, such as a standing committee on local strictures, that 
would facilitate national implementation of the JIA's provisions re-
lated to proliferation by supporting and coordinating efforts at the cir-
cuit and district levels.371 The Local Rules Project, which has 
compiled voluminous, instructive materials on, and possesses enor-
mous expertise regarding, local procedures, can help realize the above 
suggestions for reducing proliferation.372 
D. Procedures 
As general propositions, federal civil procedures must restore and 
increase uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, while limiting 
judicial discretion and expense and delay. These principles warrant 
preferring federal rules over local rules, local rules to individual judge 
procedures, and written strictures rather than unwritten requirements. 
The ideas, as general propositions, are not inviolable, and permit ex-
ceptions, especially when the concepts conflict. For example, the need 
to experiment with promising measures that save resources or time 
may undermine somewhat uniformity and simplicity. In discerning 
the appropriateness of implementing particular mechanisms, decision 
makers should employ a precisely tuned evaluation that takes into ac-
count and balances the core procedural precepts and important pro-
cess values, such as fairness and court access.373 
370. See Heiser, supra note 135; Tobias, supra note 135; see also Carl Tobias, Suggestions for 
Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359 (1995). 
371. See Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Federal Procedural Reform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49, 
78-79 (1997); see also Heiser, supra note 135, at 580-81. 
372. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. Rule 83's 1995 revision proscribing du-
plicative local procedures should also be implemented. See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (1995 amend.). It 
requires as well that "local rules conform with any uniform numbering system that may be pre-
scribed by the Judicial Conference," a system that the Conference recently prescribed and to 
which numerous districts have conformed. Id. advisory committee's note (1995 amend.); see also 
supra note 54. 
373. See Robel, supra note 2, at 1484 (suggesting similar test based on local legal culture). I 
examine local procedures before national ones for ease of analysis. 
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1. Local Procedures 
The JIA's mandates pertaining to local procedural review, whose 
enforcement the CJRA's implementation effectively suspended, 
should be strictly observed, so as to halt and even reverse prolifera-
tion. All local requirements, particularly procedures of individual 
judges, including general, standing, special, and minute orders, and 
unwritten practices, that are not needed or that conflict with or dupli-
cate the federal rules or acts of Congress must be abrogated.374 The 
largest number of remaining local strictures should be incorporated in 
local rules, while all local procedures must be reduced to writing. Dis-
tricts and judges, however, should maintain sufficient flexibility to ex-
periment with local requirements that facilitate the discovery of 
efficacious new measures and to employ techniques that address unu-
sual conditions that arise in specific courts.375 
When resolving the fate of the CJRA and local procedures ap-
plied thereunder, Congress must consult the maximum relevant em-
pirical data that is available on the mechanisms applied in the pilot 
and demonstration districts and the remaining courts. This material 
includes the information regarding the pilot and demonstration dis-
tricts that RAND and the FJC studied and on which programs the 
Judicial Conference reported to Congress, as well as the annual assess-
ments compiled by every court. The Conference apparently found, 
and Congress should remember, that invocation of procedures before 
the CJRA's passage suggests, and the 1990 statute's implementation 
apparently confirms, that procedural reforms have achieved practi-
cally all of the cost and delay reduction that could reasonably be 
expected. 
The Congress must accurately categorize the measures that re-
ceived CJRA experimentation. The strictures that clearly conserved 
expense or time while respecting significant process values should be 
included in the federal rules.376 Congress could legislatively prescribe 
those techniques for which no doubts remain. Procedures as to which 
there is lingering uncertainty may deserve consideration in the normal 
course of national rule revision. Additional mechanisms that exhib-
ited promise in limiting cost or delay but were insufficiently effica-
cious to justify national adoption because the money or time saved 
was unclear or they eroded other tenets might be identified for further 
experimentation. For example, increased reliance on magistrate 
judges, which has ameliorated docket pressures in multiple courts, and 
certain types of case management, which may be inherently district-
374. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994); FED. R. C1v. P. 83. 
375. See supra note 348 and accompanying text; infra notes 429-35 and accompanying text. 
376. The CJRA requires the Judicial Conference to make this judgment regarding the six 
statutorily prescribed principles and guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (congressional state-
ment of findings). 
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specific, probably need continued testing to ascertain whether they 
warrant broader application. Experimentation could proceed pursu-
ant to a variation of the 1991 proposed revision in Rule 83 or under a 
statute analogous to legislation prescribing court-annexed 
arbitration. 377 
Existing information suggests that Congress should allow the 
CJRA to expire, which means that districts and judges must abolish 
CJRA procedures that conflict with or replicate federal rules or provi-
sions in the United States Code. It is somewhat difficult to designate 
conclusively particular measures that deserve nationwide adoption be-
cause their evaluation remains unfinished and all relevant material has 
not been systematically analyzed and synthesized. However, rather 
definitive determinations can be posited by relying upon the RAND 
and FJC studies, the Judicial Conference Report, and much informa-
tion that is available from additional sources, namely, the courts that 
experimented.378 It now seems that some techniques in the general 
fields of case management, ADR, and discovery, as well as a number 
of devices that the CJRA did not prescribe, will limit expense or delay 
and respect the major precepts and important process values. 
Narrower suggestions regarding certain procedures can be af-
forded. Considerable judicial case management conserved time and 
perhaps cost, but the context-specific nature of most such activity au-
gurs against broad-based, much less national, application.379 Differen-
tiated case management seemed to function reasonably well in the 
two demonstration districts that intensively practiced it and in some 
other courts for very complex and simple or ordinary litigation; how-
ever, many judges found that the detriments of classifying cases into 
tracks outweighed the benefits.380 Reliance on several ADR tech-
niques in a few districts apparently yielded financial or temporal sav-
ings, but more courts ascertained that most ADR techniques 
minimally reduced expense or delay while imposing significant cost.381 
The employment of certain discovery devices in a small number of 
districts also seemed to conserve money or time.382 Numerous courts 
applied a miscellany of additional procedures principally pursuant to 
the CJRA's open-ended prescription, and certain of these measures 
decreased expense or delay.383 
377. See supra notes 74, 218-19, and accompanying text; infra notes 429-35 and accompany-
ing text. 
378. See, e.g., RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123; 
JuDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997). 
379. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text. 
380. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. But see supra note 292 and accompanying 
text. 
381. See supra notes 289, 296-97, and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 387-88 and accom-
panying text (analyzing automatic disclosure as national procedure). 
383. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (1994). 
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A special effort should be instituted to evaluate all of those local 
requirements receiving experimentation that RAND or the FJC did 
not assess. For example, the Judicial Conference, the Administrative 
Office, the FJC, individual districts, judges, and advisory groups 
should assemble, analyze, and synthesize the maximum relevant em-
pirical data and forward that material to Congress for its considera-
tion and action in light of the guidance above.384 
2. National Procedures 
Affording very specific ideas is problematic because, for instance, 
it is difficult to predict the future of civil litigation and practice, a situ-
ation that federal civil procedure's fractured present state compounds. 
Nonetheless, I can provide rather general recommendations with illus-
trations gleaned primarily from the 1993 federal rule revisions pursu-
ant to the disclaimer that those changes remain in the relatively 
nascent phases of effectuation. 
Federal Rule ll's 1993 amendment has seemingly had certain im-
pacts that the drafters intended. The new version sharply limited in-
centives to apply it, thus reducing satellite litigation over the provision 
and decreasing expense, delay, and chilling effects attributable to the 
rule.385 Several factors complicate conclusive determinations about 
the effectiveness of automatic disclosure. These include problems of 
implementation, such as erratic enforcement by some districts that 
formally adopted the technique386 and the controversial character of 
the federal amendment prescribed, the dearth of analysis accorded the 
mechanism, and the unclear results secured in the evaluations under-
taken. Anecdotal information suggests that the measure's efficacy is 
context dependent.387 The Supreme Court or Congress, therefore, 
should probably refine disclosure by restricting its application to situa-
tions in which the device seemed very effective or by authorizing con-
tinued experimentation in districts that most successfully implemented 
disclosure.388 
The local option procedure, which the revision entities incorpo-
rated in the 1993 federal rule amendments principally out of defer-
ence to contemporaneous CJRA testing, should be deleted.389 The 
384. See supra notes 348-56 and accompanying text. 
385. I premise this on an informal survey of reported and unreported Rule 11 opinions and 
on ·discussions with many participants in federal civil litigation. See also JoHN SHAPARD ET AL., 
REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Federal 
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1995); Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, AB.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 
12. 
386. See supra notes 202-13, 258, and accompanying text. 
387. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 294-95 and accom-
panying text. 
388. These suggestions are premised on experimentation with disclosure to date and on the 
conversations supra notes 211-13, 215. See also Brendan M. Stephens, Review of Federal Civil 
Discovery Rules Aims to Cut Cost, Delay, CHICAGO DAILY L. BuLL., Feb. 26, 1997, at 1. 
389. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. 
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technique imposed more disadvantages, implicating consistency and 
simplicity and corresponding cost and delay, than benefits in terms of 
enhanced flexibility for experimentation with mechanisms tailored to 
individual districts' conditions.390 The Supreme Court or Congress 
should eliminate most other authorizations for local variation in the 
federal rules, unless there is a compelling reason to employ different 
procedures in the ninety-four courts. For instance, Rule 16's local op-
tion proviso appears generally to facilitate the practice of judicial case 
management, which can vary significantly among districts, and specifi-
cally to accommodate the need for particularized, disparate treatment 
of complex and simple civil lawsuits.391 
The rule revision entities and Congress may want to consider 
whether several recent trends that involve federal civil litigation 
should be addressed more expressly and comprehensively in the ex-
isting federal rules. Examples mentioned immediately above are 
widespread reliance on judicial case management and on diverse 
measures for handling complicated and routine disputes. The revisors 
or Congress could explicitly and thoroughly provide in the rules, or 
adopt separate sets of federal rules, for case management and for dif-
ferent treatment of complex and ordinary lawsuits. However, the cur-
rent prescription in Rule 16, the Manual for Complex Litigation, 
Third, and numerous courts' local procedures for both practices might 
well suffice.392 Additional modern trends include the declining will-
ingness of many judges and attorneys to adjudicate civil cases as well 
as their increased interest in various alternatives to dispute resolution 
for settling lawsuits, which are manifested in the rise and growth of 
managerial judging and of ADR, as confirmed by CJRA experimenta-
tion.393 It may now be appropriate, therefore, to elaborate the rather 
sparse provision in the federal rules for ADR and settlement. 
E. Procedural Revision Processes 
1. The National Process 
The national rule revision process, rather than local procedural 
amendment processes, should regain and retain principal responsibil-
ity for modifying those strictures that cover federal civil litigation. 
The national process has served the courts, Congress, lawyers, parties, 
and the public exceptionally well for six decades. It is best positioned 
and equipped to revive and enhance the essential procedural precepts, 
390. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 429-35 and accom-
panying text (illustrating more effective methods of experimentation). 
391. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c); see also supra notes 30-40, 290, and accompanying text. 
392. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995); supra notes 
30-40, 49, and accompanying text. 
393. For astute exposition of the ideas in this sentence and the next, see Resnik, supra note 
8, at 549-55; Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1991, at 5; see also supra notes 31, 57, 122, 296-97, and accompanying text. 
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while the process has accumulated a wealth of expertise and can can-
vass and take into account the views of the entire federal justice sys-
tem and its ninety-four districts when drafting proposed rule changes. 
For instance, the process is a repository of ideas for promising new 
measures that could improve federal civil procedure, and it can survey 
the courts and identify those mechanisms that are sufficiently effective 
to be incorporated in the federal rules. The multiple phases of review 
and revision that comprise the process and its provision for substantial 
public participation and for serious consideration of public input im-
prove the quality of draft modifications and ostensibly insure that the 
amendments adopted are clear, fair, and responsive to the needs of all 
participants in federal civil litigation. These factors and the methodi-
cal, systematic manner in which the process unfolds can galvanize con-
sensus, particularly among judges, lawyers, and parties, regarding the 
efficacy of proposals. 
A few peculiarities that attended the proceedings that culminated 
in promulgation of the 1993 federal rules revisions complicate analysis 
of the changes in the national amendment process that the JIA im-
posed.394 This process, which was based primarily on an administra-
tive law construct of federal administrative agency rulemaking, 
functioned rather efficaciously, although certain of its aspects may 
warrant alteration or refinement. The JIA's strictures apparently 
strike an appropriate balance among numerous relevant, and often 
competing, factors. These include the benefits, such as the need for 
public comment that will inform and enhance the procedural changes 
developed and concomitant public acceptability and accountability, of 
greater openness and public involvement.395 More specifically, writ-
ten submissions and oral presentations of the public apparently con-
vinced the Advisory Committee to institute modifications that 
improved the preliminary draft proposals covering Rule 11 and auto-
matic disclosure.396 Increased openness and public participation also 
had certain detrimental impacts, namely, the time and effort required 
to address redundant or erroneous contributions and the possibility of 
politicizing rule revision which can undercut merits-based 
determinations.397 
394. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
395. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participa-
tion in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 528-29 (1970) (affording analogous insights 
in agency context); Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the 
Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 
CowM. L. REv. 906, 941-45 (1982) (same). 
396. See, e.g., supra notes 161-62, 184-92, and accompanying text. 
397. These are fixed costs of openness. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 395, at 536; Tobias, 
supra note 395, at 946-47. The balance may be proper, but Congress might tinker with its model 
by analyzing the process's length and amendment's frequency. See SuBCOMMrITEE ON LoNG 
RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RULEMAKING 
(1995), reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679 (1996) [hereinafter SELF-STUDY). 
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Having partially assimilated federal rule amendment to federal 
agency rulemaking, Congress and the judiciary may want to decide 
whether that development should be more thoroughly effectuated. 
For example, the process for soliciting, analyzing, and considering 
public suggestions might be enhanced by specifically prescribing for-
mal procedures for the Supreme Court to secure and take into ac-
count public input or requiring written responses of the other revision 
entities to public submissions.398 
More proposals for changing the federal rules must be based on 
actual experience involving careful experimentation and stringent as-
sessment of measures' effectiveness with the systematic collection, 
evaluation, and synthesis of applicable empirical information. Illus-
trative of these ideas are the troubling recent experience with auto-
matic disclosure and the difficulties implicating Rule ll's 1983 
modification and its consequent enforcement, which necessitated the 
1993 amendment.399 These complications can be partially ascribed to 
the lack of experience with the recommended revisions and the pau-
city of information on how the mechanisms operated in practice 
before the alterations were formally proposed and adopted.400 
2. Local Processes 
Numerous propositions respecting the entities that have responsi-
bility for local procedural amendment and the local requirements 
themselves are relevant to local processes for modifying proce-
dures. 401 Most importantly, there must be processes that scrutinize all 
local strictures, eliminate any provisions that conflict or are unneces-
sary, include the maximum number of measures that are not local 
rules in those procedures, restrict the quantity of local requirements, 
and reduce every local stricture to written form.402 
Some of the above ideas regarding the national rule revision pro-
cess also implicate the JIA's commands that the procedures for chang-
ing existing, or adopting new, local measures be regularized and 
opened to the public.403 For example, several reasons complicate as-
sessment of these processes' efficacy. Some courts only recently 
adopted amendment procedures, while a small number of districts 
have held revision proceedings, and the CJRA discontinued the 
398. See Tobias, supra note 147, at 144-46. See generally SELF-STUDY, supra note 397, re-
printed in 168 F.R.D. 679, 705-06 (1996). 
399. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text. 
400. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text; see also infra paragraph following text 
accompanying note 423 (suggesting why national revision process should generally take prece-
dence over statutory prescription of procedures). 
401. See supra notes 366-67, 374-84, and accompanying text. 
402. See supra note 288 ·and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 394-400 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 75-80 and accom-
panying text (affording 1988 Act's local procedural requirements). 
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processes' operation in additional courts.404 However, a few districts 
have apparently conducted efficacious proceedings, and other courts 
capitalized on that statute's effectuation to reconsider, reformulate, 
and enhance their local strictures.405 
The JIA's mandates covering local procedural revision, like the 
national process, seemed to accommodate fairly relevant considera-
tions, such as the need for helpful public comment to improve local 
requirements and for minimizing politicization of amendment proce-
dures.406 These analogous conclusions regarding the national and lo-
cal processes indicate that suggestions relating to national revision 
have similar local applicability. An important illustration involves 
regularizing and opening local processes to public scrutiny. All of the 
district judges in particular courts must cooperate with the local rules 
committees to study local procedures and develop proposals for 
change, provide the public and the bar notice of the suggested modifi-
cations, and solicit input and consider those views when finalizing 
amendments. These judges and entities might correspondingly rely on 
initiatives that the CJRA prompted. For example, they should con-
tinue fostering the constructive exchange of ideas among judicial of-
ficers and counsel, the federal districts, and state court systems that 
pervaded civil justice reform. 
F. Beyond the CIRA 
Once senators and representatives allow the CJRA to sunset, and 
federal districts and judges abolish inconsistent local procedures ap-
plied thereunder, Congress and the judiciary should explore future re-
forms. The touchstones for any general course of action and its 
specific constituents must be the restoration and enhancement of uni-
formity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and significant process val-
ues, the reduction of cost and delay, and the careful harmonization of 
those precepts when they are in tension. 
The legislative and judicial branches should ascertain as precisely 
as possible the need to save additional resources or time in resolving 
civil litigation, and, if either is substantial, how further decreases can 
best be realized. Assuming that expense and delay remain sufficiently 
problematic to warrant ongoing efforts aimed at curbing them, Con-
gress and judges might evaluate the advisability of continuing to apply 
procedural solutions. Much of the above examination suggested, and 
CJRA experimentation apparently reaffirmed, that federal and state 
404. See supra notes 130-31, 136. 
405. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF GA., PLAN TO MINI"1IZE CosT 
AND DELAY OF CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (1993); Tobias, supra note 297, at 350-51 (discussing West-
ern District of Missouri); Tobias, supra note 131, at 104 (discussing Southern District of West 
Virginia). 
406. See supra notes 394-400 and accompanying text. 
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courts have probably achieved all that could reasonably be expected 
by invoking procedures.407 
Congress and the judiciary, therefore, must decide whether cost 
or delay is troubling enough to deserve treatment with less conven-
tional, more controversial approaches and, if so, what measures would 
be most efficacious in terms of conserving money or time, of restoring 
and enhancing uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity while 
honoring related process values, and of maximizing other benefits and 
minimizing additional disadvantages. If the legislative and judicial 
branches choose to proceed, they can consider and apply a broad 
spectrum of possibilities. 
Senators and representatives could rather easily implement a 
number of alternatives that may reduce expense or delay in civil law-
suits. Several options involve federal court resources. For instance, 
Congress might appropriate larger budgets for the federal judiciary,408 
thereby enabling the courts to institute measures that could facilitate 
civil dispute resolution and limit procedural proliferation in the dis-
tricts. More specifically, numerous circuit judicial councils would 
probably discharge their responsibility to review local strictures for 
consistency, were legislative funding earmarked for that purpose. 
Congress might augment federal court resources by authorizing 
new judgeships which would permit the districts to resolve civil cases 
more rapidly. The legislative branch has periodically approved addi-
tional judges since the 1960s, and as recently as 1990.409 However, the 
current Congress, with Republican Party majorities in each house, 
seems unlikely to create judgeships during the administration of a 
Democratic president. Even if Congress approved more judges, the 
Senate's inability to fill federal court vacancies efficiently could limit 
this approach's promise.410 In any event, senators should implement 
numerous suggestions for expediting nominees' confirmation because 
promptly appointing members of the bench and seating the full com-
407. See supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text. 
408. See Year-End Report, supra note 349, at I.A. 
409. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. II, §§ 201-206, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5098-5104; see also Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629; S. 678, 105th 
Cong. (1997), available in WESTLAW, 1997 Cong. US S. 678 (Cong-Billtxt); GORDON BERMANT 
ET AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGU-
MENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 3-9 (1993). 
410. See THE MILLER CENTER OF Pusuc AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF AP-
POINTING FEDERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE SELEC-
TION OF FEDERAL JUDGES 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter IMPROVING]; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a 
Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at A30; see also infra notes 421-22 and 
accompanying text. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR 
THE FEDERAL CouRTS 102-05, 137-40 (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]; JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 88-89 (1997); Tobias, supra note 
325; Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nominees: The Senate's Steady Progress, WASH. PosT, Jan. 11, 
1998, at C9. 
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plement of judges authorized will decrease cost and delay in civil 
litigation.411 
Additional possibilities do not directly implicate federal court re-
sources. For example, Congress might attempt to write clearer legisla-
tion that would ostensibly save the expense and time entailed in 
seeking judicial resolution of the meaning of statutory language.412 
The difficulty inherent in drafting unambiguous terminology and the 
ease of articulating multiple plausible interpretations, however, proba-
bly limit this alternative's utility.413 . 
Congress could also reverse, halt, or slow its virtually uninter-
rupted, three-decade expansion of federal court civil and criminal ju-
risdiction. For instance, senators and representatives have adopted 
fewer statutes that enlarge civil jurisdiction during the 1990s than in 
comparable periods of the 1960s and 1970s,414 while the 104th Con-
gress arguably restricted jurisdiction by passing the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.415 However, the three 
measures undercut the important process value of court access, as 
might other efforts to limit jurisdiction. Moreover, these develop-
ments only constitute recent, and perhaps anomalous, exceptions to 
jurisdiction's apparently inexorable growth, which senators and repre-
sentatives seem to find an irresistible, cost-free means of cultivating 
constituents, while passage of major crime legislation in 1994 testifies 
to these phenomena.416 
Congress or the federal courts could explore and apply structural, 
administrative, or organizational remedies, some of which are appar-
411. See, e.g., IMPROVING, supra note 410, at 3-5, 11; Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude and 
the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 732-36 (1995); Carl Tobias,,Filling the Federal 
Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 325 (1996); see also Year-End Report, supra 
note 349, at I.A. 
412. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(l)(D) (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 363 
(1992); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRI= 
COURT FOR THE DISTRI= OF ALASKA pt. 1, II (1991); see also CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE 
EFFE=s OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (A. 
Fletcher Mangum ed., Federal Judicial Ctr. 1995); RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 22; 
Tobias, supra note 196, at 1535-36. 
413. See Gumo CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); see also William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990). 
414. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 284-85; Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a Na-
tional Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (stating that since the 
1960s, statutes that expanded federal district court criminal and civil jurisdiction have continu-
ously been passed). 
415. See Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321; Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(1996)); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; 
supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
416. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13701-
14223 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101~12213 (1994)). See generally LONG RANGE 
PLAN, supra note 410, at 21-39. 
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ently so nontraditional that they have never been implemented. For 
example, several districts have encouraged the courts' judges to coop-
erate in resolving cases and the districts to function as a court qua 
court.417 A more unconventional way to attain similar results might 
be alteration of the individual calendaring system that judges cur-
rently use; however, that modification would forfeit the regime's ben-
efits and be controversial. 
The legislative and judicial branches could correspondingly ex-
amine and institute less traditional approaches, such as changes in the 
existing American adversarial system. Illustrative are the English 
Rule, whereby losing parties pay prevailing litigants' attorney's fees, 
and judges' assumption of a more active, or inquisitorial, judicial 
role.418 These and numerous other measures, which are widely ac-
cepted in England and Europe, may deserve exploration, although 
they have historically been perceived as too unconventional for adop-
tion in the United States.419 Congress, and the bench as well, might 
evaluate means of changing lawyer and client conduct, including their 
limited ability to appreciate the complexity and stakes of civil lawsuits 
and to predict accurately case outcomes, which ultimately increases 
litigation costs. The legislative and judicial branches could explore 
ways of improving this behavior of attorneys and parties; however, the 
measures available may seem overly intrusive or might prove 
inefficacious. 
G. The Future of Congressional-Judicial Relations with Special 
Reference to Procedural Policy Making 
Congress and the federal judiciary must undertake concerted ef-
forts to improve frayed, if not deteriorating, relationships between the 
coordinate branches of government. Emblematic, and most relevant 
to the issues treated in this article, was the CJRA's enactment. Pas-
sage worsened long-standing legislative-judicial conflicts, a phenome-
non that may inhere in the important area of court rulemaking. 
Tensions relating to rule revision, however, could well be symptomatic 
of considerably broader difficulties implicating interbranch relations. 
For instance, members of Congress recently castigated individual 
judges for their rulings in specific cases, and this activity may have 
compromised judicial independence or bred public disrespect for the 
417. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text. 
418. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823 (1985); John Leubsdorf, Toward History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recov-
ery, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Wmter 1984, at 9. See generally Robert L. Rossi, ArroRNEYs' 
FEES § 7:4 (2d ed. 1995). 
419. For example, the Supreme Court has adhered to the American Rule. See Alyeska 
Pipeline Sewer Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Few states have correspondingly 
adopted the English Rule. See generally Langbein, supra note 418. 
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courts.420 Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Committee circulated ques-
tionnaires to judges asking how they spend time, a practice that posed 
a similar, albeit less troubling, threat.421 Members of each branch 
have also participated in disputes over courthouse construction, fed-
eral courts appropriations, and whether vacancies created by judges 
who assumed senior status should be filled.422 
These controversies, which are representative, illustrate the criti-
cal need for Congress and the federal judiciary to enhance interbranch 
relationships by increasing cooperation and communication, especially 
through candid and clear consultation on matters of significance to 
either branch. One idea that members of Congress and the bench 
should explore, and probably implement, is deferring to the coordi-
nate branch in areas for which it is primarily responsible or that impli-
cate specific expertise. For example, senators and representatives 
must refrain from attacking federal judges for decisions in particular 
lawsuits because this activity could undercut judicial independence 
and public respect. Congress might also accede in the field of federal 
procedural revision to members of the judiciary, who have more ex-
pertise and day-to-day experience with amendments' practical impacts 
and responsibilities. Judges should similarly avoid actions that unduly 
pressure senators and representatives to restrict federal court jurisdic-
tion, lest the behavior be perceived as trenching on an area principally 
entrusted to members of Congress.423 
The importance of ameliorating interbranch tensions and several 
other reasons, such as the need to restore and foster the primacy of 
the federal rules, the national revision process, and the fundamental 
tenets, indicate that Congress must exercise greater caution in legislat-
ing procedures. Senators and representatives should rarely include 
strictures that conflict with the federal rules in substantive statutes, 
much less pass procedural enactments, such as the Attorney Account-
ability Act, which would have significantly amended Rule 11 shortly 
420. The ABA was so concerned by this dynamic that it created a special commission on the 
issue. See John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50; American Bar Association 
Examines Judicial Independence, THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1996, at 2; John Gibeaut, Mending Judi-
cial Fences, AB.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 92. 
421. See Appellate Survey Results Released, THIRD BRANCH, June 1996, at 5; Conference 
Will Submit Institutional Response to Grassley Survey, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1996, at 12. 
422. See Hearing on Conserving Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation 
of Judgeships in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Before the Subcomm. on Admin. 
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 1 (1997); Bill to Prioritize 
Buildings Passes, THIRD BRANCH, June 1996, at 1; William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report 
on the Federal Judiciary (1995), reprinted in 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 491, 492-93 (1996); see also 
105th Congress' First Session Productive for Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1997, at 1-5. 
423. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 410, at 21-39, 134-35; see also Lauren K. Robel, 
Impermeable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence, and the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 71 
IND. L.J. 841 (1996). Some disputes mentioned above are close questions and may reflect the 
healthy aspect of interbranch tension. 
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after its substantial 1993 revision.424 Indeed, Congress could restrict 
legislative prescription of procedures to modifying flawed federal rule 
amendments as the final decision maker in the national revision pro-
cess. Senators and representatives might even want to remove from 
existing acts procedural provisions that contravene the federal rules, a 
phenomenon manifested when the PSLRA partially amended nine of 
those rules, unless the requirements' deletion would narrowly con-
strict federal court access or unfairly interfere with settled 
expectations.425 
Much said above in this subsection and in the article, especially 
implicating legislative branch participation in national rule revision, 
involves Congress's institutional competence as a procedural policy 
maker and suggests that it assume a comparatively limited role in the 
future.426 For instance, senators and representatives apparently did 
not attempt to harmonize the CJRA with the JIA or at least failed to 
think thoroughly through the two measures' effectuation. Moreover, 
Congress had insufficient interest in the CJRA to monitor closely its 
implementation or to abstain from embarking on new initiatives 
before the 1990 effort had received evaluation. Legislative introduc-
tion and consideration of the legal reforms in the Contract with 
America and passage of the PSLRA preceded completion of the 
RAND and FJC studies, Judicial Conference reports, and a recom-
mendation to Congress predicated thereon, and congressional resolu-
tion of the CJRA's fate.427 The PSLRA's partial modification of 
numerous federal rules in securities cases concomitantly eroded those 
provisions, uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity and the JIA's 
critical purpose of restoring the primacy of the federal rules and na-
tional rule revision.428 Indeed, Congress may lack the requisite under-
standing of CJRA experimentation to make well-informed decisions 
regarding statutory expiration and, therefore, might consider defer-
ring to the suggestions of the Judicial Conference. 
424. See H.R. 988, § 4, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Tobias, supra note 234, at 707-10, 721-24. 
See generally supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
425. See supra notes 234-35, 352, and accompanying text. I appreciate that Congress meant 
the PSLRA to curb litigation abuse, while it has legislated many procedures to facilitate litiga-
tion vindicating rights of statutory beneficiaries, such as discrimination victims. See Tobias, 
supra note 11, at 285, 314-17. I could also be criticized for advocating a double standard; how-
ever, the needs for broad court access and to honor settled understandings justify differential 
treatment. 
426. See Burbank, supra note 210, at 856; Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The 
Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 800-05, 817-18 (1993); see also Collo-
quy, Perspectives on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3, 3-112 (1992) (debating efficacy 
of 1990 supplemental jurisdiction statute); supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing 
Rule 4's legislative revision). 
427. See supra notes 121, 123, 234-35, and accompanying text. 
428. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; 
see also Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 537, 550-52 
(1998); Tobias, supra note 234, at 724-26. 
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Finally, nothing that I stated earlier in this article is intended to 
intimate that local district testing of promising procedures for reduc-
ing expense or delay or fostering significant process values must cease. 
On the contrary, my recommendations are completely compatible 
with, and I wholeheartedly endorse, efficacious future experimenta-
tion, while senators and representatives should prescribe the maxi-
mum feasible testing pursuant to the ideas below. 
H. Experimentation 
Congress should provide for future experimentation with a com-
prehensive, balanced approach, premised on a modified version of the 
1991 proposed revision in Federal Rule 83 that the Advisory Commit-
tee withdrew out of apparent solicitude for the ongoing CJRA en-
deavor.429 This suggested amendment would have empowered any 
district with Judicial Conference authorization to test for as much as 
five years local measures that contravene the federal rules or acts of 
Congress.430 One or more of the ninety-four courts could function as 
laboratories for experimenting with mechanisms that seem efficacious 
enough to deserve broader application.431 
The seven-year CJRA effort and recent experience involving 
court-annexed arbitration might also guide future testing. For in-
stance, the 1990 statute's implementation teaches the importance of 
centralized coordination and oversight and cautions against too much 
simultaneous experimentation with significant numbers of inconsis-
tent procedures. The court-annexed arbitration endeavor concomi-
tantly illustrates the advisability of testing and evaluating specific 
devices in relatively few districts and gradually expanding work with 
techniques that prove effective.432 Courts, judges, the Judicial Confer-
ence, and Congress, therefore, should carefully consider and calibrate 
experimentation. 
Each of the district judges in conjunction with local rules commit-
tees of all ninety-four courts might study their local circumstances 
when designing and proffering experimental programs. These judges 
and entities could draw upon, and perhaps elaborate, the CJRA's ef-
fectuation in their own and the remaining districts, as well as state civil 
justice reform activities, when analyzing and designating measures 
that might warrant testing and when developing experimental proto-
429. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. I rely substantially here on A Leo 
Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 
(1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experi-
ments, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67; see also Levin, supra, at 1585-87 (sug-
gesting why reasons implicating authority require Congress, not rule revisors, to prescribe Rule 
83 revision). 
430. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
431. The Rule 83 proposal included no criteria for analyzing proposals to experiment. The 
procedures proffered should show promise and be necessary to treat specific problems. 
432. See supra note 74. 
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cols. For example, helpful sources of information and ideas should be 
the advisory group reports, the expense and delay reduction plans, 
and the annual assessments prepared under the 1990 legislation; the 
procedures, particularly the principles, guidelines, and techniques that 
actually received experimentation and evaluation; and the participants 
involved in the federal efforts. Local districts, judges, and committees 
might correspondingly rely on the enormous quantity of valuable ma-
terial and the accumulated technical expertise that exist in the Admin-
istrative Office, the FJC, and the Judicial Conference committees as 
well as in state civil justice systems, much of which is available through 
the National Center for State Courts (NCSC). 
The Judicial Conference could structure and coordinate testing 
with the approval mechanism in the proposed Rule 83 revision that 
the Advisory Committee withdrew. For instance, it can guarantee 
that experimentation proceeds under optimal conditions by meticu-
lously monitoring the number of districts that are testing similar meas-
ures at the same time. The Conference should concomitantly 
encourage experimentation in enough circumstances to afford statisti-
cal validity and a sense of the procedures' efficacy but in sufficiently 
few situations to minimize duplication and disruption of daily dispute 
resolution. 
A critical aspect of any experimentation that courts undertake 
will be its rigorous assessment. For example, the districts should artic-
ulate and apply defensible analytical standards, create appropriate 
baselines, invoke proper mechanisms for evaluating measures' im-
pacts, and assess the procedures with adequate rigor in different con-
texts for sufficient periods to ascertain accurately their effectiveness. 
Informative templates are the RAND and FJC analyses of pilot and 
demonstration court testing and numerous studies that the FJC, the 
Administrative Office, and the NCSC have performed.433 The dis-
tricts could depend on court staff who participated in civil justice re-
form and on the FJC and the Administrative Office for technical 
assistance in their evaluative efforts, while the districts might rely on 
these policy arms or the Judicial Conference to coordinate assessment 
across courts or to supply perspective or additional expertise. 
When experience with, and analysis of, particular mechanisms in 
specific districts suggest that more courts could employ the tech-
niques, the Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference must de-
termine whether the measures require greater experimentation or are 
effective enough to deserve nationwide enforcement. Should in-
creased testing be warranted, the Committee or 'the Conference must 
estimate how much additional work is needed and identify commodi-
ous contexts for future efforts. When either entity finds national ap-
433. See, e.g., RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108; FJC STUDY, supra note 123; CHURCH 
ET AL., supra note 337; MEIERHOEFER, supra note 74; SHAPARD ET AL., supra note 385. 
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plication appropriate, the Advisory Committee ought to develop 
proposed revisions for examination in the federal rule amendment 
process. The Committee should have final responsibility for the du-
ties delineated in this paragraph and for general oversight and coordi-
nation because it has a number of rule revision obligations, a systemic 
viewpoint, and considerable experience with, and appreciation for, the 
practical effects of civil litigation, experimentation, and procedural 
change.434 
Many reasons warrant prescription and implementation of the 
approach suggested. It is premised upon the well-considered, readily 
available model in the proposed Rule 83 amendment.435 This course 
of action invokes institutions that have substantial expertise related to 
testing and capitalizes on the CJRA experience. The approach ac-
commodates numerous perspectives and needs, certain of which are 
even conflicting. For instance, it affords the necessary flexibility to 
undertake the experimentation that should foster the discovery and 
application of mechanisms that revive and reinforce the essential pro-
cedural precepts, including economical, expeditious dispute resolu-
tion, but limits the disruption of day-to-day case disposition. This 
method of proceeding is purposely structured in a circumscribed man-
ner that avoids or minimizes some problems with the CJRA's effectu-
ation, namely, the local proliferation of inconsistent strictures and the 
concomitant propensity to increase fragmentation, cost, and delay. It 
correspondingly capitalizes on this statute by facilitating the develop-
ment of promising experiments from the bottom up and by employing 
lessons from the seven-year effort. For example, centralized, system-
atic control over the number of courts that can simultaneously apply 
identical measures should permit many districts to profit from earlier 
testing and facilitate the effective analysis of experimentation as it 
progresses. The approach also accommodates additional work with 
judicial case management, which probably represented _the CJRA's 
greatest success, even though its practice varied significantly across 
courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1988 were valuable attempts to improve the state of 
modem federal civil procedure. Diverse, and perhaps inconsistent, vi-
sions of the most pressing complications in fin-de-siecle civil litigation 
and of appropriate remedies for those problems apparently motivated 
the legislation's drafters. The two measures have been in tension be-
cause the CJRA's proponents may have failed to think fully through 
434. The Conference or one of its committees would be equally competent to assume these 
duties, and the Advisory Committee should consult them. 
435. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
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its effectuation and apparently did not harmonize the acts' implemen-
tation. Despite these conflicts and additional difficulties involving the 
JIA and CJRA and their application, each statute offered a number of 
advantages. If the individuals and entities with responsibility for the 
condition of federal civil procedure follow the recommendations in 
this article, they can realize the legislation's best features and enhance 
civil litigation as federal courts enter the twenty-first century. 
